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STATUTORY CONSTRAINTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING
ANTHONY O'ROURKE*
Although constitutional scholars frequently analyze the relationships
between courts and legislatures, they rarely examine the relationship between
courts and statutes. This Article is the first to systematically examine how the
presence or absence of a statute can influence constitutional doctrine. It
analyzes pairs of cases that raise similar constitutional questions but differ
with respect to whether the court is reviewing the constitutionality of
legislation. These case pairs suggest hat statutes place significant constraints
on constitutional decisionmaking. Specifically, in cases that involve a
challenge to a statute, courts are less inclined to use doctrine to regulate the
behavior of nonjudicial officials. By contrast, in cases where no statute or
regulation is at issue, courts are more likely to construct regulatory doctrinal
rules. The Article supports this hypothesis by identifying three structural
reasons why statutes are likely to have this influence on judicial
constitutional decisionmaking. By drawing upon work in legal philosophy
and the social sciences, this Article shows that statutes can shape
constitutional law in ways that judges fail to reflect upon and usually take for
granted.
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INTRODUCTION
In constitutional cases, is the presence or absence of a statute likely
to influence a court's doctrinal choices? The question would seem to be
both obvious and of obvious importance. Obvious in the sense that any
student of statutory interpretation is well versed in the debate over
whether and how statutes operate to constrain judges in nonconstitutional
cases.' Important because most constitutional cases involve judicial
review of a statute or some other form of codified text.2
Interestingly, however, scholars have paid little attention to whether
the presence or absence of a statute is likely to influence judicial
constitutional decisionmaking. Of course, there is a deep body of
1. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative
Canons, 113 COLuM. L. REv. 531, 532-33 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)) (discussing the
statutory interpretation debate between "new textualists, who maintain that the rule of
law as well as democracy requires that judges be tightly 'constrained' by strict rules," and
"pragmatists and purposivists, ... who believe that the process of legal reasoning from
text, legislative purpose, and precedent constrains judges").
2. Consider, for example, the seven constitutional cases from the Supreme
Court's October 2013 Term that SCOTUSblog identifies as "major cases." See Statistics,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/statistics/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2015)
(presenting a table of dispositions by month of sitting that lists "major cases" in red). The
case that raised a criminal procedure question did not involve a constitutional challenge
to a statute or regulation. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (holding that
police generally may not conduct a warrantless search of digital information on a
suspect's cell phone). Four out of the six remaining cases, by contrast, involved a
constitutional challenge to legislation or a state constitutional provision. See Harris v.
Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (invalidating the Illinois collective bargaining statute as
applied to require state-subsidized home health care employees to pay union agency
fees); McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (invalidating a Massachusetts "buffer
zone" statute restricting protests around abortion facilities); Schuette v. Coal. to Defend
Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (upholding a Michigan constitutional
provision prohibiting public universities from adopting race-conscious admissions
policies); McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm 'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (invalidating a
federal campaign statute limiting the aggregate amount of money individuals may donate
to multiple candidates in an election cycle); cf Noel Canning v. NLRB, 134 S. Ct. 2550
(2014) (holding that the Recess Appointments Clause did not permit the president o fill
agency vacancies during a three-day Senate recess); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S.
Ct. 1811 (2014) (upholding a town's practice of opening public board meetings with
prayer).
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scholarship using the lens of deference to examine the relationship
between courts and legislatures.3 However, with one notable exception,
legal scholars have not considered the related, but substantively different,
relationship that exists between courts and statutes.4 Although scholars
will sometimes suggest that the mere presence or absence of a statute
shapes a particular area of constitutional doctrine,5 there has been no
sustained analysis of why, or indeed whether, statues would have such an
effect.
This omission owes, in part, to the limited domain of cases that
scholars examine when analyzing questions of legislative and judicial
deference. Somewhat understandably, scholars who are interested in the
3. See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
4. The exception is Anthony Amsterdam, who once speculated that in
constitutional cases where there is a legislative text at issue, the Court's decisionmaking
"is informed and greatly assisted by the very fact that it is legislation or a regulation or a
rule of some sort that is in question." Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and
the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 791 (1970). By
contrast, Amsterdam observed, constitutional criminal procedure has largely developed in
a legislative void that both forces the Supreme Court "into the role of lawmaker... and
makes it virtually impossible for the Court effectively to play that role." Id. at 790.
5. In the four-and-a-half decades since Anthony Amsterdam first observed that
the lack of criminal procedure cases involving statutes might explain a great deal about
that area of constitutional doctrine, see supra note 4, a few articles have independently
suggested that the presence or absence of statutes might be relevant to the development of
particular subareas of constitutional law. The fact that these articles (including one by this
author) do not cite Amsterdam (or each other) for this proposition might speak to lasting,
subconscious influence of Amsterdam's observation. Compare Amsterdam, supra note 4,
at 790 ("In most areas of constitutional law the Supreme Court of the United States plays
a backstopping role, reviewing the ultimate permissibility of dispositions and policies
guided in the first instance by legislative enactments, administrative rules or local
common-law traditions. In the area of controls upon the police, a vast abnegation of
responsibility at the level of each of these ordinary sources of legal rulemaking has forced
the Court to construct all the law regulating the everyday functioning of the police."),
with Anthony O'Rourke, Structural Overdelegation in Criminal Procedure, 103 J. CRtM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 445 (2013) ("In most constitutional adjudication, the court
reviews a regulatory strategy that was designed by a legislature or executive
agency .... In crafting criminal procedure rules, however, judges must design regulatory
strategies with the benefit of only a few law clerks helping research and draft
opinions...."), and John Rappaport, Second Order Regulation of Law Enforcement,
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) ("In most constitutional adjudication, the Supreme
Court reviews regulation authored by a legislature or agency (hence 'judicial review'). In
criminal procedure, by contrast"-whether or not it sees itself as doing so-"the Court
typically writes the regulations itself"); see also Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian,
An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L REV.
1, 74-79 (2013) (arguing that the statutory nature of copyright law has constrained the
extent to which courts deliberate over its constitutional dimensions); Dru Stevenson,
Judicial Deference to Legislatures in Constitutional Analysis, 90 N.C. L. REV. 2083,
2093 (2012) (arguing that there is "reason to believe that the Supreme Court shows
deference to state legislatures when considering the constitutionality of state statutes in
the context of the Fourth Amendment").
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relationship between courts and legislatures have restricted their inquiry
to constitutional cases that involve statutes. They may focus, for
example, on cases about whether a statute violates the Commerce
Clause,6 whether a statute governing executive detentions is acceptable
under the Suspension Clause,7 or whether a statutorily codified school
voucher program is acceptable under the Establishment Clause.8 This
Article demonstrates, however, that we can learn something by
expanding the domain of inquiry to cases that do not involve statutes. For
example, when a court decides whether a traffic stop complies with the
Fourth Amendment, it must directly evaluate the constitutionality of a
police officer's conduct without reviewing the constitutionality of a
statute or regulation.9 By comparing the reasoning in these cases with the
reasoning in cases that raise similar constitutional questions but involve
the review of legislation, one can better appreciate how statutes might
constrain constitutional decisionmaking.
Consider, for example, two recent Fourth Amendment cases
upholding warrantless police searches. In one, the Supreme Court
rejected an as-applied challenge to a statute authorizing police officers to
collect DNA samples from arrested suspects.0 In the other, in which no
statute was at issue, the Court held that an officer had probable cause to
use a trained, drug-sniffing police dog to conduct a vehicle search." In
both cases the Court confronted a Fourth Amendment question arising
from a biotechnology,2 and in both cases the Court decided in the
government's favor.'3 But did the presence or absence of a statute
influence how the Court used doctrine to regulate the ways in which
police officers use these investigatory technologies going forward?
6. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
7. E.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
8. E.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
9. This is, of course, an oversimplification. As discussed below, the police
officer is likely subject to detailed departmental regulations governing traffic stops. For
purposes of this Article, however, the operative question is whether the court has
identified and interpreted a statute or regulation governing the officer's conduct. See
infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
10. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1962 (2013).
11. See Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1051 (2013).
12. See Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the
Divided Court, 127 HARV. L. REv. 161, 161 (2013) (arguing that the opinion in Maryland
v. King "represents a watershed moment in the evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine
and an important signal for the future of biotechnologies"); Irus Braverman, Passing the
Sniff Test: Police Dogs As Surveillance Technology, 61 BUFF. L. REv. 81, 85 (2013)
(analyzing the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Harris and arguing that drug-sniffing
dogs should be understood as a form of biotechnology).
13. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1962; Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1051.
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Or consider two cases that were both (at least short-term) victories
for opponents of affirmative action. In one, the Court invalidated a
"special admissions" program that a state medical school adopted
without any statutory guidance.'4 The controlling opinion in that case
proposed a detailed framework for implementing race-conscious
admissions policies, and this framework became the template for higher
education affirmative action programs throughout the country.15 In the
other case, decided last Term, the Court upheld a state constitutional
provision that prevented public universities from using race as a factor in
admissions.16 In reaching this conclusion, the Court expressly disavowed
any authority to prevent voters from deciding whether or not to permit
universities to adopt race-conscious admissions policies.'7 As a matter of
constitutional doctrine, these cases are perfectly compatible. As a matter
of judicial decision-making strategy, they are radically different. Can the
absence of a statute in one case, and the presence of a statute in another,
help to account for this difference?
The answer to this question, I argue, is yes. By examining these
pairs of cases, and other pairs that raise similar constitutional questions
but differ with respect to the presence or absence of a statute, this Article
shows that statutes do in fact influence and constrain constitutional
decisionmaking.'8 More specifically, in cases involving what I call
"textual review"-that is, in constitutional cases that require courts to
interpret a statute or regulation to rule on the merits-courts are less
likely to use doctrine as a way of regulating the behavior of nonjudicial
officials.'9 In cases that do not involve textual review, by contrast, courts
are more apt to use doctrine as a tool for governing the activity of
nonjudicial officials.20 Thus, cases involving textual review are likely to
produce what one might call "regulatory" modes of decisionmaking with
14. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 266-67 (1978).
15. See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
16. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1623
(2014).
17. See id. at 1635 ("The constitutional validity of some of those choices
regarding racial preferences is not at issue here. The holding in the instant case is simply
that the courts may not disempower the voters from choosing which path to follow.").
18. A few words about this methodology are in order. The case pairs were
selected based on (1) the similarity of the constitutional issues in each case and (2) to
examine a cross-section of constitutional subareas in which the court reviews both cases
involving a statute or regulation and cases that do not. Importantly, they were not selected
based on how strongly they confirm this Article's statutory constraint hypothesis. Nor did
I identify reject case pairs on the ground that they posed a challenge for this Article's
hypothesis. Cf Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CIa. L. REv. 1,
112-14 (2002) (discussing the danger of selection bias in small-n studies).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part II.
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respect to how courts use doctrine to incentivize and monitor the
behavior of nonjudicial officials.21
There are sound theoretical reasons for why statutes might serve this
important constraining function in constitutional decisionmaking.22 First,
statutes consist of a fixed and canonical formulation of words, and this
textual canonicity may lead judges toward a shared understanding of the
issue before them in constitutional cases that involve legislation.23 By
contrast, in cases that do not involve legislation, judges may be more apt
to disagree about the scope of the constitutional issue before them and to
frame the issue in whatever way best enables them to implement their
policy aims. 4 Second, with respect to constructing a system of rules,
courts play a structurally different role in textual review cases, where
they review a formal regulatory policy that a legislature has established,
than in nontextual review cases, where the court may perceive itself as
having to fill a regulatory void.2 5 This structural difference, I argue, will
lead courts in nontextual review cases to adopt more detailed doctrinal
rules and to focus on the operational realities of the officials who must
conform to the courts' orders.2 6 Third, in textual review cases courts may
decide to take advantage of what they believe to be the superior
institutional design of legislatures with respect to resolving some
constitutional questions.27 If a court recognizes that a constitutional issue
involves considerable policy complexity, it may enlist the legislature's
aid in resolving the issue and will accordingly construct a less regulatory
doctrinal rule.
21. This Article argues that statutes act as an exogenous constraint on
constitutional decisionmaking. A rival hypothesis is that, as a rhetorical strategy, courts
may omit any mention of a statute when they wish to engage in regulatory
decisionmaking and invoke the existence of a statute when they wish to rule in a less
regulatory fashion. However, my examination of the parties' briefs for the cases
discussed in Part II of this Article suggests that courts do not regularly engage in this type
of strategic manipulation. See infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Part 1II.
23. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 77-78 (1999).
24. See infra Part III.A. In constructing this argument, I draw upon Jeremy
Waldron's arguments concerning the epistemic benefits of the fact that rules enacted by
statutes have a canonical linguistic formulation. See WALDRON, supra note 23, at
77-82.
25. See infra Part III.B.
26. Cf ARTHUR STINCHCOMBE, WHEN FORMALITY WORKS: AUTHORITY AND
ABSTRACTION IN LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS (2001) (analyzing ways in which formal
systems [including legal systems] are constructed to adequately guide those whose
actions the systems are meant to govern).
27. See infra Part III.C.; cf Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional
Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277 (2001) (analyzing the institutional
features of Congress that would enable it to play a greater role in constitutional
lawmaking).
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There are, however, two significant limits to the scope of this
Article's examination. First, and somewhat artificially, the Article
focuses on the ways in which statutes constrain constitutional
decisionmaking and brackets the question of how administrative
regulations do so.28 Second, the Article does not claim that the presence
or absence of a statute can explain which side will prevail in a
constitutional dispute. Instead, it argues that statutes can influence the
doctrinal reasoning by which a court justifies the outcome of a case.
(And, of course, this Article does not deny that there are other,
countervailing influences that may sometimes lead courts to adopt
relatively nonregulatory modes of decisionmaking in textual review
cases.) Accordingly, while this Article may lay the theoretical
groundwork for future statistical work on judicial behavior, its
hypothesis is compatible with the view that a judge's ideology is the best
predictor of her vote in a constitutional case.29
Notwithstanding its scope limitations, this Article lays the
groundwork for understanding a phenomenon that may have significant
consequences for constitutional law. William Eskridge and John
Frerejohn have recently argued legislatures shape constitutional meaning
through the content of the laws they choose to enact.30 The phenomenon
of statutory constraint, however, suggests that legislatures may also
shape constitutional meaning in ways that are independent of the content
of the statutes they enact. If the mere existence of a statutory text can
alter a court's method of constitutional decisionmaking, then legislatures
28. However, many of the theoretical claims of this Article appear to apply with
equal force to both statutes and regulations. I therefore intend to address the question of
regulatory constraint in a subsequent piece.
29. That is, this Article's claims are compatible with the "attitudinal" model of
voting to which most political scientists subscribe. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED
312-56 (2002) (describing the statistical validity using the Supreme Court justices'
ideology to predict their votes); see also LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY
OF RATIONAL CHOICE chs. 2-5 (2013) (surveying contributions to the attitudinal model
and testing the degree to which judicial ideology influences voting at the Supreme Court,
appellate court, and district court levels).
30. See WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FREREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 14 (2010) (arguing that "normative commitments are
announced and entrenched ... through the more gradual process of legislation,
administrative implementation, public feedback, and legislative reaffirmation and
elaboration"); id. at 16 (contending that both federal "superstatutes" such as the Civil
Rights Act and state "statutory convergences" serve to give specific content to the
general norms articulated in the Constitution); see also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003) (locating Congress's power to
interpret the Constitution in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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can curb the more troubling effects of judicial review simply by passing
statutes. By contrast, if legislatures leave officials to execute their duties
without statutory guidance, they unwittingly strengthen the judiciary's
role in governance. Thus, the phenomenon of statutory constraint may be
useful for understanding how constitutional law is likely to evolve in the
current era of legislative stasis
3' and political dysfunction.32
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I introduces the concept of
textual review and argues for the methodological importance of
examining how the presence or absence of a statute will shape a court's
decisionmaking in cases that raise similar constitutional issues. Part II
argues that courts engage in less regulatory decisionmaking in textual
review cases and supports this hypothesis by analyzing pairs of cases
involving criminal procedure, affirmative action, abortion protest, and
intellectual property. Part III explores three potential structural causes for
the differences between decisionmaking in textual and nontextual review
cases. Part IV discusses the limits of this Article's hypothesis and
examines cases in which other political or structural pressures
overshadow the constraining effect of textual review.
I. TEXTUAL AND NONTEXTUAL CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
One of the most well-worn debates in constitutional law concerns
the appropriate balance of power between federal courts and the
coordinate branches.33 Despite the extraordinary attention paid to this
issue, however, scholars have largely overlooked the differences between
constitutional decisionmaking that involves statutory interpretation and
constitutional decisionmaking that does not. The distinction is simple,
but it nevertheless deserves some explanation given the degree to which
it has been ignored in the literature.
31. See Jonathan Weisman, Congress Avoids Being Least Productive Ever,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2014, 2:50 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2014/
09/26/current-congress-looks-destined-for-least-productive-crown/?_r--1 (reporting that
the number of bills enacted under the 113th Congress was the second lowest in history,
and that the lowest number was enacted under the 112th Congress).
32. See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT
LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW
POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 101-11 (2012) (arguing that the United States' legislative
pathologies have rendered the political system "dangerously broken"); Jonathan Zasloff,
Courts in the Age of Dysfunction, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 479, 480 (2012) (arguing that
"America itself has reached the Age of Dysfunction, when the formal institutions of U.S.
constitutional government have become impotent to deal with the nation's most
important challenges").
33. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
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A. The Characteristics of Textual Review
Simply put, some constitutional cases involve a constitutional
challenge to a statute or regulation and thus require courts to interpret
that text in order to decide on the merits of the claim at issue. For the
sake of brevity, this Article refers to this phenomenon as "textual
review." Significantly, while this Article's scope is limited to examining
how statutes constrain constitutional decisionmaking,34 its definition of
textual review also encompasses cases that involve the review of agency
regulations. Accordingly, a case that does not involve textual review is
one in which a court does not need to interpret a statute or regulation in
order to decide the merits of a constitutional claim.35
Consider, for example, two recent criminal procedure cases
delineating the scope of the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest exception
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. In Maryland v. King,
36
the Supreme Court upheld a statute authorizing the police to collect a
suspect's DNA after arresting him. 37 Like most constitutional cases
outside the domain of criminal procedure, King involved textual review.
By contrast, in Arizona v. Gant,38 the Court held that the warrantless
trunk search of a suspect's vehicle was not a constitutional search
incident to a lawful arrest.39 However, the Court in Gant did not review
the constitutionality of any statute or regulation that governed how police
34. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
35. As defined here, a case may involve nontextual review even if it requires a
court to interpret statutes that impose procedural or jurisdictional limitations on reaching
the merits of a claim. In constitutional tort cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for
example, a court may have to determine whether a municipality has adopted an
unconstitutional policy or "custom" in order to determine whether it can be held liable
under a particular constitutional violation. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep 't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding that local governments can be liable under § 1983 for
injuries caused by the "execution of a government's policy or custom"). Similarly, under
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act a federal court may not grant habeas
relief to a state prisoner for a constitutional violation unless a state court's adjudication of
the claim was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012)). In these cases, the court must
interpret a statute as a precursor, and possibly a bar, to deciding the merits of a
constitutional claim. Unlike in textual review cases, however, the constitutionality of the
statute itself, or of some application of the statute, is not being challenged.
36. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
37. Id. at 1962.
38. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
39. Id. at 335.
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officers decide whether to execute such searches.40 Thus, like most
run-of-the-mine Fourth Amendment cases, Gant did not involve textual
review.
While this working definition of textual and nontextual review is
easy to grasp, a more precise account of the phenomenon is theoretically
helpful. As the concept is defined here, there are three distinguishing
characteristics of textual review.
1. TWO-LAYER TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION
First, the most salient feature of textual review cases is that they
require courts to interpret at least two legal texts to decide on the merits
of the case. Of course, all constitutional cases require courts to interpret
the Constitution.41 Even when judicial precedent is dispositive with
respect to whether a challenged action is unconstitutional, a court will
have to at least implicitly turn to the Constitution to identify which of its
provisions has allegedly been violated.42 In cases that do not involve
textual review, however, the court's interpretive obligations may end at
this step. In cases involving textual review, by contrast, the process
requires a second act of interpretation beyond deciding on the meaning
of the Constitution itself. Specifically, the court must interpret the
meaning of a statute43 or administrative regulation44 to decide whether
there was a constitutional violation. Accordingly, in textual review cases,
the task of deciding how the Constitution was allegedly violated is
fundamentally an interpretive endeavor, which requires that a court
40. Id. (holding the Fourth Amendment's search-incident-to-an-arrest exception
did not authorize the warrantless search of a vehicle where the defendant could not have
accessed his car at the time of the search).
41. See PHILLIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 9-24 (1982). This is not to say,
of course, that all constitutional cases must be decided based solely on the text of the
Constitution. As I am using the phrase, "constitutional interpretation" may involve any of
the modes of argument (doctrinal, historical, prudential, etc.) that judges and advocates
traditionally invoke.
42. Cf Nicholas Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REv
1209, 1227 (2010) ("A constitutional challenge is a challenge to governmental action.
Any such challenge should begin with a claim about who has violated the Constitution.").
43. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2572-75 (2012) (upholding the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate requirement
and striking down provisions incentivizing states to expand Medicaid).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 221 (2005) (holding that
the mandatory application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violates the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116-17 (1976)
(holding that a Civil Service Commission regulation barring resident noncitizens from
federal civil service employment violates the Fifth Amendment's due process clause).
Constitutional Decisionmaking
discern the meaning of a statute or regulation in order to decide whether
that text prescribes an unconstitutional action.45
2. NONTEXTUAL REVIEW AND UNEXAMINED TEXTS
Second, and relatedly, for the purpose of identifying whether a case
involves textual review, the operative question is not whether there exists
a statute or regulation governing an actor's conduct. Instead, the
operative question is whether the court interprets a statute or regulation
in order to decide the constitutionality of that conduct. Broadly speaking,
many nontextual review cases will involve actions that are governed by a
statute or regulation that is not on the court's horizon while deciding the
case. For example, in Scott v. Harris,46 the Supreme Court held that a
Georgia police officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment by using
deadly force to stop a high-speed chase that was endangering the lives of
bystanders.47 The officer's conduct was governed by a Georgia statute
that authorizes "peace officers" to use deadly force "when the officer
reasonably believes that the suspect poses an immediate threat of
physical violence to the officer or others.'A8 However, the Court in Scott
did not review the constitutionality of this statute, and the case therefore
involved nontextual review.49 By contrast, Tennessee v. Garner,s° the
first Supreme Court case addressing the Fourth Amendment's limits on
the use of deadly force by law enforcement officers, involved an
as-applied challenge to a statute authorizing the use of deadly force.5'
Conceivably, the litigants in Scott also could have framed their Fourth
Amendment claim as an as-applied challenge to this statute.52 However,
45. Joseph Raz, Why Interpret?, 9 RATIO JURIS 349 (1996) (arguing that the
legal interpretation consists of establishing the meaning of authoritative legal directives).
46. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
47. See id. at 381. The deadly force at issue in Scott involved a pursuing officer
ramming the suspect's car from behind. Id. at 374; see also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.
Ct. 2012, 2016-17 (2014) (holding that officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by
firing shots at a fleeing suspect during a high-speed chase that was threatening the lives
of bystanders).
48. GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-4-20(b) (West 2014).
49. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 377-78. Scott involved a civil claim under 42 U.S.C
§ 1983. Id. at 375. This jurisdictional posture, however, does not transform Scott into a
case involving textual review because the Court was not required to interpret § 1983 in
order to resolve the Fourth Amendment question at issue. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
50. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
51. ld. at 6-7.
52. Cf Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298-1300 (2011) (holding that
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a prisoner could bring an as-applied challenge to a Texas statute
governing prisoners' access to post-conviction DNA testing).
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they did not do so, and the Court treated Scott as a Fourth Amendment
case that did not require any statutory interpretation to resolve on the
merits.3
Thus, to determine whether a case involves textual review, one must
consider the court's perspective as to whether the case requires an act of
statutory or regulatory interpretation. In a nontextual review case, the
court does not perceive an actor to be bound by a statute when engaging
in the conduct at issue. This does not mean, however, that the actor
himself did not feel bound by a statute. Moreover, even in nontextual
review cases where there is no codified text with the force of law
governing an official's actions, the official may still have been operating
in accordance with some type of regulatory policy. For example, courts
sometimes review assertions of executive power that lack legislative
authorization and will uphold those assertions of power in situations
where Congress had traditionally acquiesced to such assertions.4 When
the president acts without statutory authority, however, his
decisionmaking is typically the product of extensive internal deliberation
and, some argue, meaningful legal constraints.5 5 Likewise, lower-level
officials, such as police officers conducting a warrantless search, may
also be acting pursuant to (sometimes unwritten) departmental policies
that a court does not need to interpret in order to resolve a case.56
53. Scott, 550 U.S. at 377-78.
54. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 531 (2008) ("[I]f pervasive enough, a
history of congressional acquiescence can be treated as a 'gloss on "Executive Power"
vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II."' (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 686 (1981))); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S.
579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[A] systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned,
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it
were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a
gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II."); see also Trevor W.
Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1448, 1500
(2010) (observing that Justice Frankfurter's theory of legislative acquiescence "obviously
requires" that Congress be given notice of the executive action in question).
55. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between
Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423 (2009) (describing the
confluence of internal and external constraints, including legal doctrine, that influence
decisionmaking in the executive branch); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism,
124 HARv. L. REV. 1688, 1692 (2011) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND
FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010)) (arguing that legal constraints "have real, if
imperfect, traction" within the executive branch "even on matters of grave importance
and during times of heightened strain").
56. See, e.g., Ligon v. City of NY, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 520-22 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (describing NYPD training practices on when and how to conduct warrantless
stops and searches, and concluding the training suggested a departmental policy of
promoting unlawful searches). Notably, the Supreme Court will occasionally grapple
with the constitutionality of written police department policies in textual review cases.
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Furthermore, even a government official who seems to be operating
without any external policy guidance may be conducting her duties
according to an unwritten set of rules and norms that guide her
behavior.57 Thus, a case that does not involve textual review is not
necessarily one in which an official was acting lawlessly.
Accordingly, although many nontextual review cases involve the
constitutionality of actions that are rule-governed, a court does not
interpret those rules in the course of deciding the case.58 Instead, the
court looks only to the action itself, decides whether it is constitutional,
and perhaps provides (or invokes) a legal standard to guide officials in
future cases.59 By contrast, in textual review cases, the court must
interpret the statute or regulation that governed the action and decide
whether that text was constitutional. Thus, the concept of textual review
exposes how a court's perception of a constitutional problem differs
when it is interpreting a law from when it is examining real-world
actions without engaging in the practice of statutory interpretation.
3. AS-APPLIED CASES AND TEXTUAL REVIEW
Third, it bears emphasizing that the concepts of textual and
nontextual review are not coextensive with the categories of facial and
as-applied constitutional challenges. Quite obviously, a facial
constitutional challenge to a statute is an instance of textual review. So
too, however, is an as-applied challenge. In as-applied cases, even if a
See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 5 (1985) (considering an as-applied challenge
to a statute authorizing law enforcement to use deadly force on fleeing suspects and
noting that the officer's actions were also governed by a departmental policy that was
"slightly more restrictive" than the challenged statute).
57. See Meghan Stroshine et al., The Influence of "Working Rules" on Police
Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making, 11 POLICE Q. 315, 316-18 (2008)
(describing the "working rules police officers use to distinguish suspicious from
nonsuspicious people, places, and circumstances" and evaluating the extent to which
personal, organization, and legal factors influence the development of these rules); see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556,
1558 (2004) (arguing that "moral shortcuts, or rules of thumb, that work well most of the
time, but that also systematically misfire" play "a pervasive role in moral, political, and
legal judgments").
58. In some cases, the court is explicit in its decision to avoid interpreting the
regulations that govern an official. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815
(1996) (rejecting the argument that plainclothes police officers violated the Fourth
Amendment by stopping a vehicle in violation of departmental policy).
59. See O'Rourke, supra note 5, at 418 (arguing that in order to implement a
constitutional right, "a court must craft doctrinal rules that govern the conduct of law
enforcement officials, and determine how significantly it wishes to limit, or expand, the




court devotes most of its attention to the actions that allegedly gave rise
to a constitutional violation, it must still engage (at least tacitly) in some
degree of statutory interpretation. King, for example, involved an
as-applied challenge to a statute authorizing police officers to obtain
DNA samples from arrested suspects.60 Theoretically, it would have been
possible for the Supreme Court to address this constitutional question in
a case that did not involve a challenge to a statute. (That is, the Court
could have taken a case from a jurisdiction that did not authorize
post-arrest DNA searches by statute or formal agency regulation but
where a police department chose to conduct such searches as a matter of
policy.) However, the Court's analysis in King differed from the type of
analysis that would have occurred in such a case because, in King, the
Court first established the meaning of the Maryland statute before it
reached a constitutional decision.6'
With respect to the Court engaging in this interpretive step, King is
not an outlier among as-applied cases. As Richard Fallon has argued, the
decisions in as-applied cases range from broad rulings that invalidate
many applications of a statute to narrow rulings that are limited to the
facts at issue.62 Regardless of whether a court's holding is broad or
narrow, however, it engages in an interpretive practice that does not
occur in a case in which there is no statute at issue. If the court wishes to
rule broadly, it must look beyond the facts of the case to consider other
potential applications of the statute, and thus it engages in an interpretive
practice.63 If the court wishes to rule narrowly on an as-applied
challenge, it is likely to consider whether it is possible to invoke the
constitutional avoidance canon and adopt some saving interpretation of
the challenged statute.64
60. Marylandv. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1966 (2013).
61. See id. at 1967 (discussing the language of the statute).
62. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 915, 924 (2011) (arguing that "when a challenger asks a court to hold a
statute invalid in fewer than all applications, there can be a considerable range of choice
about just how broadly a ruling of partial invalidity might sweep"); id. at 968-69
(arguing that it is "sometimes doubtful" whether the Supreme Court's description of a
challenge as facial or as-applied "should be taken at face value").
63. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Assoc., Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 545 U.S.
429, 433-38 (2005) (interpreting the scope of a state statute to resolve an as-applied
dormant commerce clause challenge).
64. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557
U.S. 193, 204-10 (2009) (applying the constitutional avoidance canon to avoid reaching
the merits of a constitutional challenge to the Voting Rights Act); Richard L. Hasen,
Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 Sup. CT. REV.
181, 203-06 (arguing that Justice Roberts's application of the constitutional avoidance
canon in NAMU.DNO led to an interpretation of the challenged statute that was not
supported by the text or the legislative history).
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Thus, regardless of a court's preferred constitutional agenda,
resolving an as-applied challenge requires some form of statutory
interpretation. The distinction between facial and as-applied challenges
therefore is a variable that works alongside the distinction between
textual and nontextual review in constraining a court's constitutional
decisionmaking.65 By paying attention to the distinction between textual
and nontextual review, it is possible to identify features of constitutional
adjudication in statutory cases that cannot be explained in terms of the
traditional distinction between facial and as-applied cases.
B. The Significance of Textual Review
By introducing the concept of textual review, this Article draws
attention to a subject that scholars have overlooked: how statutes, as
opposed to legislatures, shape constitutional lawmaking (and likewise
how regulations, as opposed to agencies, shape constitutional
lawmaking). To be sure, questions about the scope and limits of
legislative power are a mainstay of constitutional law and are central to
doctrinal debates concerning separation-of-powers,66 federalism,67 and
individual rights.68 However, when constitutional scholars discuss these
65. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
66. Questions about the judiciary's role in policing Congress to protect the
Constitution's separation-of-powers and federalism values are central to the debate over
the "political safeguards of federalism." See Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into
the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 215 (2000) (updating and
defending the political safeguards theory); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1459,
1460-62 (2001) (summarizing and critiquing contributions to the political safeguards
literature); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543, 559-61 (1954) (arguing that the states' structural role in the national political
process is sufficient to protect federalism values without aggressive judicial policing of
Congress's Article I powers). For a recent discussion of the Supreme Court's specific
doctrinal strategies for using Article I to police legislative discretion, see Aziz Z. Huq,
Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L. REv. 575,
586-614 (2013) (describing how the Supreme Court has developed a "de facto system of
'tiers of scrutiny"' that governs the scope of Congress's enumerated powers under Article
I of the Constitution).
67. See supra note 66 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Alison L. LaCroix,
The Shadow Powers of Article 1, 123 YALE L.J. 2044, 2051 (2014) (arguing that recent
doctrinal shifts in federalism cases have "partially revived Justice Holmes's conviction
that the best way to approach the federalism question is by inquiring into the scope of
Congress's powers").
68. See JotiN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-75 (1980) (presenting
the foundational account of political process theory, which holds that courts should be
ready to invalidate statutes that are the product of a defective political process, and using
the theory to defend the Warren Court's equal protection decisions); Nimer Sultany, The
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questions of legislative power, they traditionally deploy the concept of
deference.69 While scholars have not adhered to a consistent definition of
"deference,"70 the concept is central to debates over whether courts
should defer to the coordinate political branches' understandings of the
Constitution-that is, debates over judicial supremacy.71 It is likewise
central to debates over whether courts should defer to legislative findings
State of Progressive Constitutional Theory: The Paradox of Constitutional Democracy
and the Project of Political Justification, 47 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 371, 405-08 (2012)
(summarizing and critiquing the contributions of more recent political process theorists).
For accounts of how political process theory has tacitly influenced recent equal protection
and substantive due process doctrines, see Anthony O'Rourke, Windsor Beyond
Marriage: Due Process, Equality & Undocumented Immigration, 55 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2171, 2194 (2014) (arguing that the reasoning of United States v. Windsor involves
an innovative use of political process theory in a substantive due process context);
Bertrall L. Ross II, The Representative Equality Principle: Disaggregating the Equal
Protection Intent Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 175, 181-83, 223-38 (2012)
(explaining and defending the Supreme Court's holdings in equal protection vote dilution
cases on political process grounds). But see Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics:
The Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721, 722 (1991) (arguing that
John Hart Ely's political process theory "simply misdescribes what the Court does when
it decides cases").
69. This vast literature ranges from normative legal scholarship on the extent to
which courts should defer to legislative judgments, see, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 77-88 (1980), to
descriptive work in political science on the extent to which the political branches do in
fact constrain the judiciary, see, e.g., MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE
CONSTRAINED COURT: LAw, POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE 164-66
(2011); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
70. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1983) (arguing that deference is "not a well-defined concept but rather an
umbrella that has been used to cover a variety of judicial approaches"); Daniel J. Solove,
The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L.
REv. 941, 945 (1999) ("[T]he concept of deference remains malleable, indeterminate, and
not well-defined."); see also William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional
Fact-Finding in Rights-Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
878, 882 (2013) (characterizing the "deference question" as "radically under-theorized"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
71. For a sampling of this massive literature, see LARRY D. KRAMER: THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); KEITH
E. WHITTINGTON, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY
(2007); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA.
L. REV. 83 (1998); Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123 (1999); Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional
Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335 (2001); Frank I. Michelman, Living with Judicial
Supremacy, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579 (2003); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular
Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027
(2004); Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and
Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656 (2000); Frederick Schauer,
Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1045 (2004).
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in support of statutes that are being challenged as unconstitutional.72
Common to most of the constitutional deference literature, however, is a
focus on the relationships between the Supreme Court and Congress (as
well as between the Court and the executive branch) as distinct political
institutions.
This scholarly focus on deference to legislatures, to the exclusion of
any serious theoretical examination of legislation, has obscured
important questions about how statutes-that is, the actual texts that
legislatures produce-shape the constitutional reasoning of judges.
Specifically, the deference framework requires scholars to frame
constitutional decisionmaking in terms of whether one political
institution-the Supreme Court-should (or does) defer to other political
institutions-Congress and the executive. This aspect of the deference
framework has given rise to a significant methodological limitation that
this Article rejects in order to better analyze the ways in which statutes
constrain constitutional decisionmaking.
This methodological limitation relates to the domain of
constitutional cases that scholars have relied upon to study the dynamics
between courts and legislatures. With respect to studies of congressional
deference, the domain consists exclusively of cases involving statutes.73
Specifically, legal scholars traditionally have explored questions of
legislative deference by using interpretive and doctrinal methodologies to
evaluate whether the Supreme Court has deferred to Congress in specific
72. For examples of this scholarship, see DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS (2008); Araiza, supra note 70;
Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision Making, 98
IOWA L. REV. 465 (2013); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to
Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1 (2009); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding
and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169 (2001);
Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the
Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707 (2002); F. Andrew
Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447
(2010); John 0. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST.
COMMENT. 69 (2008); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 229 (1985). Additionally, scholars and judges also invoke the concept of
constitutional deference to analyze the degree to which courts defer to the legal
interpretations and factual findings of administrative agencies. See Solove, supra note 70,
at 945; see also Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative
Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029 (2011) [hereinafter
Berger, Individual Rights]; John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial
Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996);
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969
(1992). Because the scope of this Article is limited to the relationship between courts and
statutes, I will forego any deeper discussion of this use of the concept.
73. And, with respect to studies of executive deference that are largely outside
the scope of this Article, the domain of cases consists of cases in which the president's
actions are constitutionality challenged.
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cases.74 Based on such case-specific analyses, these scholars tend to
make generalizable inferences about the Court's decisionmaking based
on these case studies.75 Thus, if a constitutional scholar wishes to
evaluate whether the Court exhibited deference when reviewing a statute,
she will focus on the holding of the case in which the statute was being
challenged and will explore the specific doctrinal moves that the Court
made in the majority opinion. Given the interpretive demands of this
technique, legal scholars will often focus on a subset of cases that are
particularly current or that have achieved canonical status.76
Surprisingly, political scientists have also disregarded cases that do
not involve statutes when studying the extent to which Congress can
constrain the Supreme Court's constitutional decisionmaking. The
statistical approach to studying Supreme Court decisionmaking requires
that scholars amass ufficient data to test rival hypotheses that might be
superior to the scholar's favored hypothesis in terms of explaining a
certain set of observations.77 Given this methodological imperative, it
would seem that political scientists who study the dynamics between the
Supreme Court and Congress should examine both constitutional cases
that involve a statute and cases that do not involve a statute but which
involve substantively similar constitutional questions. It appears,
however, that political scientists who examine whether the Supreme
Court defers to Congress in separation-of-powers cases have restricted
their inquiry to those cases in which the Court is reviewing federal
legislation.78
74. See Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal
Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 155 (2002) (explaining that, in contrast to empirical
political science literature, "[t]he substance of much legal scholarship is doctrinal,
interpretive, and normative").
75. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 27-64 (2012) (concluding that the Roberts Court is insufficiently respectful of
the democratic political process based on the Court's holdings in Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010), National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012), and a range of other constitutional and statutory cases).
76. Cf Goldsmith & Vermeule, supra note 74, at 159 (defending legal scholars'
tendency to examine cases that "have attained canonical status in the relevant academic
community, or have become focal points around which academic communities organize
their debates").
77. See Epstein & King, supra note 18, at 76-82 (discussing the need to
identify control variables in order to make reliable causal inferences).
78. For example, the most comprehensive empirical assessment on whether
Congress constrains the Supreme Court's constitutional decisionmaking relies on a data
set of every Supreme Court decision involving the constitutionality of federal legislation.
See Tom S. Clark & Keith E. Whittington, Ideology, Partisanship, and Judicial Review of
Acts of Congress, 1789-2006 (Jan. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (concluding, based on the same database, that the Supreme Court is more likely to
facially invalidate statutes when it is in ideological conflict with Congress, but finding no
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This restriction limits the depths to which one can explore how
Congress might constrain the Supreme Court's constitutional
decisionmaking. As this Article argues, the existence of a statute might
shape a court's constitutional decisionmaking for reasons that are distinct
from those that deference scholars have identified.79 In order to make a
case for these claims, I engage in a comparative analysis of cases that
address similar constitutional issues but differ with respect o whether the
Court is reviewing a statute.80 Although I employ the doctrinal and
interpretive methodologies of traditional legal scholarship, my
comparative analysis makes use of a promising control
variable-constitutional cases that do not involve statutes-to identify
unexamined constraints on courts' constitutional decisionmaking.
By expanding the denominator of cases that one examines, it is
possible to explore features of constitutional lawmaking that deference
scholars have thus far overlooked. Consider, for example, the difference
between the as-applied Fourth Amendment challenge in King to a statute
authorizing post-arrest DNA searches and a hypothetical challenge to a
post-arrest DNA search that a police officer undertook pursuant to an
unwritten departmental policy. The constitutional issue in each
case-whether the search was reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment-would be identical, and a Supreme Court holding
in one case would govern the outcome in the subsequent case. In the
as-applied case, however, the Court must engage in statutory
interpretation as a step toward deciding whether the search is
unconstitutional.81
Does this practice influence the ways in which a court reasons its
way through a constitutional problem? This question is impossible to
answer by focusing exclusively on the reasoning of King, and it is
difficult to answer by limiting oneself to imagined hypotheticals like the
one above. However, one can compare the decision in King to other
such correlation with respect to as-applied challenges); Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme
Court A "Majoritarian" Institution?, 2010 SuP. CT. REv. 103, 143 (2010) (characterizing
Clark and Whittington's article as "the most comprehensive study" of the Court's
deference to the coordinate branches in constitutional cases); see also, e.g., BAILEY &
MALTZMAN, supra note 69, at 164-66 ("To identify cases where a doctrine of deference
to Congress is particularly applicable .... [w]e. . . read each case identified ... to ensure
that they involved the constitutionality of a law enacted by Congress and the president.");
Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Congress, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a
Constitutional Separation of Powers Model, 55 AM. J. POL. Sci. 89 (2011) (testing
whether Congress constrains the Supreme Court's constitutional decisionmaking by
estimating the ideological preferences of the Court and Congress over legislation that has
been challenged as unconstitutional).
79. See infra Part III.
80. See infra Part II.
81. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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Fourth Amendment cases that involve similar constitutional issues but
that do not involve any legislative text.82 Thus, by rejecting the
simplifying assumptions of the deference framework, one can make use
of the conceptual tools necessary to ask this question-and perhaps even
to answer it.
II. STATUTORY CONSTRAINTS & REGULATORY DECISIONMAK1NG
A primary goal of this Article is simply to argue that scholars
should begin to think more rigorously about the ways in which statutes
constrain constitutional decisionmaking. As an affirmative project,
however, this Article offers a hypothesis about how constitutional cases
involving statutes differ from those that do not. Specifically, this Part
argues that courts are less likely to use doctrine to aggressively regulate
the behavior of nonjudicial officials. This is a descriptive claim, which I
support by examining the Supreme Court's analyses in cases that involve
similar constitutional questions but differ with respect to whether the
Court must interpret a statute to decide that question. I do not purport,
however, to provide an exhaustive or even fully representative survey of
the court's analysis in cases involving statutes. Instead, my aim is to
provide an account of constitutional decisionmaking in statutory and
nonstatutory cases that is plausible, if not persuasive.8 3 If this account is
sufficiently compelling, it will adequately justify the deeper exploration
(provided in Part III of this Article) of the structural features of textual
review that might motivate courts to analyze those cases differently than
they do cases which do not involve textual review.
A. Defining Regulatory Decisionmaking
This Article's descriptive claim might best be articulated in the
inverse: in constitutional cases that do not involve textual review, courts
tend to engage in what one might call a "regulatory" mode of
decisionmaking, characterized by doctrinal rules that impose more
detailed and burdensome obligations on the officials they govern.
Inversely, in constitutional cases that require the court to interpret a
statute or regulation to decide on the merits, courts are less likely to
engage in this type of regulatory decisionmaking. This concept of
regulatory judicial decisionmaking is one that scholars of constitutional
82. See infra notes 125-38 and accompanying text.
83. Cf Jeffrey R. Lax, The New Judicial Politics of Legal Doctrine, 14 ANN.
REv. POL. SCl. 131, 134 (2011) (urging legal scholars to examine "how judges use
doctrine to get what they want" and arguing that such scholarship is valuable as a
springboard for formal and empirical work).
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law and criminal procedure sometimes invoke84 but rarely define.
Moreover, those scholars who use the concept of regulatory
decisionmaking have not applied it to analyze the dynamics between
courts and legislatures.85 Therefore, some elaboration on the concept is
helpful.
84. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1984) (arguing that "[t]he Supreme Court is a regulator");
Eric J. Miller, Putting the Practice Into Theory, 7 OHiO ST. J. CRIM. L. 31, 38 (2009)
(characterizing criminal procedure doctrines as "regulatory strategies" designed to govern
the conduct of low-level actors); O'Rourke, supra note 5, at 409 (arguing that in criminal
procedure cases "the court must ... act as a regulator and craft a set of doctrinal rules
designed to ensure that law enforcement officials will implement ... [the Court's]
constitutional objective"); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2470 (1996)
(observing that "constitutional criminal procedure is a species of substantive criminal law
for cops"); see also Rappaport, supra note 5, at 103 n. 1 (citing additional scholarship
characterizing criminal procedure doctrine as a "substantive form of regulation of
law-enforcement officers and other state actors").
85. When deploying the deference framework, see supra notes 66-76 and
accompanying text, separation-of-powers scholars will often treat deference as a binary
whereby a court is deemed to have deferred to a legislature if it upheld a law and to have
not deferred to the legislature if it invalidated the law. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Three
Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1073 (2008)
("Deference... involves a decisionmaker (DI) setting aside its own judgment and
following the judgment of another decisionmaker (D2) in circumstances in which the
deferring decisionmaker, Dl, might have reached a different decision."). Political
scientists routinely make this simplifying assumption when studying the extent to which
Congress constraints the Supreme Court's constitutional decisionmaking. See, e.g., Tom
S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy, 53 AM. J.
POL. ScI. 972 (2009) (concluding from a database of cases in which the Supreme Court
upheld or invalidated federal statutes that the Supreme Court is constrained by
Congressional efforts to "curb" the Court's independence); Clark & Whittington, supra
note 78, at 2-3, 23 (concluding based on the same database that the Supreme Court is
more likely to facially invalidate statutes when it is in ideological conflict with Congress,
but finding no such correlation with respect to as-applied challenges); Luke M. Milligan,
Congressional End-Run: The Ignored Constraint on Judicial Review, 45 GA. L. REV. 211,
232-41 (2010) (summarizing additional relevant separation-of-powers literature in
political science). However, constitutional scholars also commonly employ this binary
assumption. Formally, judges and many deference scholars distinguish between the
decision to defer to a legislature's factual determinations and the ultimate legal decision
whether to invalidate the law. See Araiza, supra note 70, at 886 (arguing that the
Supreme Court assumes a distinction between legal conclusions and deference to factual
determinations "by reserving for itself the power to interpret law while recognizing a role
for congressional fact-finding"); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 229, 233-35 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court creates doctrinal
confusion when making a sharp distinction between fact-finding and legal analysis
because "law and fact ... are points of rest and relative stability on a continuum of
experience). But see Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact
Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (2003) (arguing that there is no "qualitative or
ontological distinction" between law and fact); McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 72, at
93-94 ("[I]t is ultimately difficult to understand what it would mean to adhere to a
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For the purposes of this Article, a court engages in "regulatory"
decisionmaking when it uses doctrine to incentivize nonjudicial officials
to engage in specific behaviors that are not clearly set forth by a statute,
regulation, or constitutional text. To further clarify, a constitutional
decision can be regulatory in at least two respects. First, the decision may
articulate rules of liability that incentivize officials to either perform or
86avoid performing specific actions.6 In this regard, some of the most
familiar rules of constitutional criminal procedure-such as that a
warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable,87 or that police
metaphysical or epistemological distinction between legal interpretations and social facts
since law itself is a social fact."); Saul M. Pilchen, Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding
When the Supreme Court Should Defer to Congressional Factflinding Under the
Post-Civil War Amendments, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 337, 396-97 (1984) (arguing that
"characterizing a matter as one of law or a fact is no more than a conclusion ... that one
branch of government rather than another should make the decision in question").
However, even those who defend this fact-law distinction argue that, in practice, the
Court's decision whether to defer to a legislature's factual findings almost invariably
determines the outcome of the case. See Araiza, supra note 70, at 957 (acknowledging
that "if one controls the facts in a case, one likely controls the result and, for all practical
purposes, the law"); Eric Berger, In Search of A Theory of Deference: The Eighth
Amendment, Democratic Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L.
REv. 1, 4 (2010) ("The levels of deference-judicial respect for the political branches'
policy judgments and factual determinations-are often outcome determinative in
constitutional cases." (footnote omitted)); see also Solove, supra note 70, at 953-54
("The practice of deference has drastic effects on the outcomes of cases because factual
and empirical evidence plays an enormously influential role in the interpretation of the
Constitution.").
86. This description of how courts construct liability rules to implement federal
constitutional rights is grounded in what Mitch Berman has described as the "decision
rules" model of constitutional adjudication. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision
Rules, 90 VA. L. REv. 1 (2004). The decision rules model distinguishes between a court's
articulating of the meaning of a constitutional provision, which Mitch Berman calls a
"constitutional operative proposition," and the "decision rule" by which courts determine
whether the constitution has been satisfied. Id. at 9. A government official who wishes to
fully honor her constitutional obligations (as defined by the judiciary) will try to comply
with the constitutional operative propositions that a court articulates. See id. at 87-88
(discussing the constitutional obligations of "conscientious state actors"); see also Trevor
W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1533,
1602-04 (2007) (explaining that under the decision rules model it is the president's
obligation to comply with constitutional operative propositions). Ultimately, however,
constitutional decision rules determine what a reluctant government official must do in
order to avoid judicial sanction. See Berman, supra, at 10-12. For other significant
contributions to the decision rules model, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING
THE CONSTITUTION (2001); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1274 (2006); Henry P. Monaghan,
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1975); Kermit Roosevelt
III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L.
REv. 1649, 1656 (2005); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
87. See Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 586 (1980).
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generally must recite the Miranda warnings before conducting an
interrogation88-are exemplars of regulatory decisionmaking. Second, a
decision may impose detailed and relatively burdensome remedies to
address the violation of a constitutional right.89 This type of regulatory
decisionmaking is exemplified by cases in which the Supreme Court
authorizes judicial orders designed to remedy systemic constitutional
violations such as prison overcrowding9" and school segregation.9'
In practice, it is frequently difficult, and sometimes misleading, to
disentangle the doctrinal linkages between constitutional rights, liability
rules, and remedies.92 However, with respect to both the process of
determining liability and that of crafting remedies, scholars have called
attention to the ways in which the Supreme Court constructs precise
doctrinal rules to implement open-textured constitutional norms.93 More
recently, political scientists and legal scholars have begun to
systematically examine the ways in which judges also use doctrine
instrumentally to advance their ideological aims and extraconstitutional
policy goals.94 As Jeffrey Lax has observed,95 legal doctrine can act both
88. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
89. For important systematic examinations of the relationship between
constitutional rights and judicial remedies, see, for example, Abram Chayes, The Role of
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1282 (1976); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies-And Their Connections to
Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REv. 633, 635 (2006); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J.
Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REv
1731 (1991); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, The Supreme Court 1978
Term, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1979); Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality:
Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CALIF. L. REv. 735, 740 (1992); Alfred Hill,
Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1109, 1110 (1969).
90. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1922-23 (2011).
91. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 721, 745 (1974) (authorizing
interdistrict school desegregation remedies when constitutional violations in one school
district have a "significant segregative effect" in another). But see Missouri v. Jenkins,
515 U.S. 70 (1995) (limiting judicial authority to such remedies for intradistrict
constitutional violations).
92. See Fallon, Jr., supra note 89, at 683 (arguing that "justiciability,
substantive, and remedial doctrines are substantially interconnected and that courts
frequently face a choice about which doctrine to adjust in order to achieve acceptable
results overall"); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REv 857, 873-89 (1999) (arguing that the undesirability of certain remedies
shapes the ways in which courts define the scope of particular constitutional rights).
93. See supra notes 86, 89.
94. See, e.g., Toby J. Heytens, Doctrine Formulation and Distrust, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 2045 (2008); O'Rourke, supra note 5, at 445. Outside legal scholarship,
political scientists contributing to the "new judicial politics" literature have developed
innovative formal models to examine the ways in which ideological differences between
judges are reflected in doctrine and how judges can strategically use doctrine to advance
their policy goals. See Lax, supra note 83 (surveying the "new judicial politics"
literature); see also Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political
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as a tool by which judges can pursue their policy aims (as political
scientists typically argue)96 and as a meaningful constraint on judicial
decisionmaking (as legal scholars traditionally assume).97 In order to
effectively advance their policy goals, judges must craft doctrinal rules
that effectively communicate those goals to the officials who are
empowered to execute them.98 Thus, even ardently ideological judges
will care about doctrine, precedent, and other forms of legal discourse
"because they wield these as communicative devices to achieve policy
goals."99 However, because legal discourse is an imperfect tool for
communicating an explicitly ideological goal, this mode of
communication will constrain judges to a greater degree than if they
were able to dictate their preferred outcome of a case without engaging
in traditional modes of legal reasoning.'00
As this new judicial politics literature suggests, a judicial opinion
can be regarded as "regulatory" to the extent that the judge uses doctrine
to influence and regulate the behavior of nonjudicial officials.
Specifically, the Supreme Court frequently uses constitutional doctrine to
influence the substantive outcomes of lower court cases-for example,
by establishing a rational basis standard of review for equal protection
Control, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 326 (2007) (modeling the judicial choice between creating
determinate and indeterminate legal doctrine in light of factors including the expected
ideological preferences of lower court judges); Jeffrey R. Lax, Political Constraints on
Legal Doctrine: How Hierarchy Shapes the Law, 74 J. POL. 765 (2012) [hereinafter Lax,
Political Constraints] (elaborating upon Jacobi's and Tiller's model to the ways in which
judges' doctrinal choices are influenced by factors including the desire to control case
outcomes and conflicts with lower courts). Until recently, scholars of judicial
decisionmaking have overlooked this research question in their haste to affiliate with
either the "attitudinal" or "legal" model of judicial behavior. See David S. Law & David
Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1653, 1740-41 (2010) (arguing that "[t]he widespread adoption of
a theoretical vocabulary that pits the 'legal model' against the 'attitudinal model' has
perhaps encouraged a tendency" to erroneously view the models as mutually exclusive).
95. See Lax, supra note 83, at 135.
96. Specifically, scholars who adhere to the "attitudinal model" emphasize the
degree to which the Supreme Court Justices' values and attitudes can predict their votes.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
97. See Law & Zaring, supra note 94, at 1674 & nn.83-85 (citing legal
scholarship that criticizes attitudinal scholars for providing unsatisfactory accounts of
how law shapes judicial decisionmaking and arguing that empirical scholars should not
"focus[] upon ideological explanations of judicial behavior to the exclusion of legal
explanations"); Lax, supra note 83, at 132 (arguing that "the legal-attitudinal-strategic
framework has ... stunted theory development and blocked ... fruitful" intersections
between doctrinal and empirical scholarship).




claims that the Court disfavors.10 1 Additionally, the Court can (and does)
use doctrine to govern the behavior of other government officials even
when its formal constitutional authority extends only to regulating the
decisions of lower courts.102 Consider, for example, Mitch Berman's
analysis of the rules the Supreme Court established in Miranda v.
Arizona'10 3-a decision that is unquestionably regulatory in character. The
Court established the familiar "Miranda warnings" to enforce the Fifth
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, which, by its terms, guarantees
only a trial right not to "be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."104 In Miranda, Berman argues, the Supreme
Court correctly interpreted the Self-Incrimination Clause only to bar the
introduction of a defendant's compelled statement in a criminal case
regardless of whether the statement was made outside formal
proceedings.10 5 However, to enforce this interpretation, the Court
established a rule that directed trial courts not to admit any statements
that a defendant made during a custodial interrogation unless the
defendant was first advised of specific protections-the now-famous
"Miranda wamings"-and chose to waive those protections. 106 Because
this rule is directed toward lower courts and governs admission of
evidence, it is a textually legitimate implementation of the
Self-Incrimination Clause's trial right.107 At the same time, however, the
rule is obviously intended to affect the conduct of law enforcement
officers, who (the Court assumed) wish to ensure that the statements they
elicit from criminal suspects are admissible in court.108 Thus, in Miranda,
the Court exercised its constitutionally legitimate authority under the
Self-Incrimination Clause to regulate the conduct of lower courts, and it
101. See Heytens, supra note 94, at 2048, 2065-66. Additionally, the Court can
monitor and correct lower court decisions through doctrinal strategies such as
characterizing an issue as a question of law (and thus subject to de novo appellate review)
rather than a question of fact (and therefore subject to deferential appellate review). Id. at
2048.
102. See O'Rourke, supra note 5, at 415-22 (describing how the Supreme Court
uses criminal procedure doctrine to regulate the behavior of police and other nonjudicial
officials).
103. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see Berman, supra note 86, at 126-29.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Berman, supra note 86, at 126-29; see also id.
at 32-35 (providing an exposition of Berman's decision-rules model of constitutional
adjudication).
105. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460-61; Berman, supra note 86, at 117-18
(arguing for this interpretation of Miranda).
106. Berman, supra note 86, at 117-18.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 129 (arguing that "[t]he Miranda majority expected and hoped
that police officers wanted inculpatory statements to be admitted and would, therefore,
issue the warnings (and respect their invocation by suspects").
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used that authority to create rules that incentivize police officers to
engage in a specific type of conduct when conducting an arrest.
Accordingly, while Berman conceives of constitutional "decision rules"
as directions for lower courts to adjudicate constitutional claims, it is also
appropriate to think of courts as engaging in a "conscious process of rule
making" for nonjudicial officials.
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Beyond obviously regulatory decisions such as Miranda,
constitutional cases fall on a spectrum with regard to whether they are
more or less regulatory with respect to the conduct of nonjudicial
officials. Decisions are undoubtedly not regulatory if they offer no clear
guidance to the officials who are bound to follow whatever constitutional
requirement is at issue in a case. An extreme example of such a decision
is a per curiam opinion in which the court invalidates a statute or
reverses a conviction on constitutional grounds without providing any
analysis.1 0 In more subtle cases, a decision is not regulatory to the extent
that it is "narrow," focusing on the particulars of the dispute before the
court without attempting to guide officials' behavior in subsequent
cases."' Hence, the task of identifying whether a decision is "regulatory"
requires a contextualized analysis of whether an opinion is likely to
influence the behavior of nonjudicial officials in specific and predictable
ways.
This task does not always admit of easy answers. Scholars who
examine the instrumental use of doctrine have assumed that courts use
bright-line rules to govern and monitor the behavior of officials and use
flexible standards when they do not wish to undertake this form of
regulation.!12 However, the regulatory/nonregulatory distinction does not
fall along such a simple axis. Of course, bright-line rules such as those in
109. Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1455, 1470
(1995); Steiker, supra note 84, at 2470 (describing constitutional criminal procedure rules
as "conduct rules" that "are addressed to law enforcement agents regarding the
constitutional legitimacy of their investigative practices").
110. See, e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam) (reversing
an obscenity conviction without analysis); Mary Anne Case, Are Plain Hamburgers Now
Unconstitutional? The Equal Protection Component of Bush v. Gore as a Chapter in the
History of Ideas About Law, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 55, 63 n.54 (2003) (describing the
Warren Court practice of "Redrupping," whereby the Court would invalidate obscenity
laws per curiam without any of the Justices offering reasons for their decision).
111. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REv. 353, 362-64
(2006) (describing minimalist judges as favoring "narrow rulings" in constitutional cases
that "do not venture far beyond the problem at hand, and attempt to focus on the
particulars of the dispute before the Court").
112. See Heytens, supra note 94, at 2057-58; Lax, Political Constraints, supra
note 94, at 768-70. For two influential contributions to the rules-versus-standards
literature, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 586 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HAnv. L. REv. 24, 60-61 (1992).
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Miranda are regulatory in terms of incentivizing police to engage in
specific forms of conduct. However, courts can also influence the
behavior of nonjudicial officials by articulating a balancing test that
incentivizes specific sets of behavior. Suppose, for example, that the
Supreme Court chose to modify the holding in Miranda by requiring that
courts evaluate whether a defendant's self-incrimination right was
violated by balancing four factors, none of which are dispositive:
(1) whether the defendant was read the traditional "Miranda warnings,"
(2) whether the defendant's interrogation was videotaped, (3) whether
the defendant was given a 10 to 15 minute break per hour during the
interrogation, and (4) whether the interrogating officer either touched or
raised her voice at the defendant. Under the rules/standards taxonomy,
this balancing test is a standard because it requires judges to make an ex
post legal determination of whether specific conduct violates the Fifth
Amendment.' 13 However, this standard would undoubtedly incentivize
police departments to adopt specific interrogation policies concerning the
reading of traditional Miranda warnings, videotaping interrogations,
providing breaks, and officers' physical conduct and tone of voice during
interrogations.
Admittedly, this definition of regulatory decisionmaking is
incomplete. In an important respect, all constitutional decisions involve a
choice of how to regulate state action. 14 If a court chooses to uphold a
statute without further elaboration, it is approving a regulatory system
that is meant to guide executive action. If the court invalidates a statute
but relies on the legislature to create new rules to govern executive
action, it is also making a regulatory choice. This Article, however,
reserves the term "regulatory" for decisions in which the court chooses to
regulate officials directly through doctrine. In doing so, the Article draws
attention to the role that courts cast for themselves alongside legislatures
and executive agencies in the task of governing the day-to-day actions of
state officials.
113. See Kaplow, supra note 112, at 560 (maintaining that "the only distinction
between rules and standards is the extent to which efforts to give content to the law are
undertaken before or after individuals act"); Sullivan, supra note 112, at 60-61
(characterizing the use of balancing tests as "standard-like in that it explicitly considers
all relevant factors with an eye to the underlying purposes or background principles or
policies at stake").
114. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 910 &
n.184 (1987) (describing the Holmesean insight that the legal status quo is not a




B. Regulatory Decisionmaking and Textual Review
In order to decide whether a decision is "regulatory" in character,
one must carefully assess whether a decision is likely to influence the
behavior of nonjudicial officials in ways that are consistent with the
court's apparent policy aims. This is fundamentally an interpretive task,
and accordingly this Article supports its hypothesis by examining sets of
cases that address similar constitutional questions but differ with respect
to whether the constitutional challenge concerns a statute.15 Given this
methodology, the cases involve only those doctrinal areas for which
there are both statutory and nonstatutory constitutional cases.
By using this methodology, it is possible to identify significant ways
in which the presence of a statute appears to constrain constitutional
decisionmaking. Specifically, the cases below suggest hat courts are less
inclined toward regulatory decisionmaking in constitutional cases that
involve textual review. By contrast, the holdings in cases that do not
involve textual review often include rules that impose more specific, and
often more burdensome, substantive obligations on the officials they
govern. Rather than simply address whether or not an official's actions
violated the Constitution, these holdings will articulate how such
officials could modify their conduct in future cases to avoid
constitutional sanction.
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
It is no accident that the governance regime of Miranda was
established in a case in which there was no statute at issue-that is, in a
case not involving textual review. As William Stuntz observed,
constitutional criminal procedure functions "like a species of tort law,
defining liability rules for a given set of actors in the criminal justice
system but using the threat of reversal in criminal litigation rather than
damages or injunctive relief to enforce those standards.11 6 That is,
criminal procedure doctrine is designed to implement the Constitution's
criminal procedure guarantees but often does so by incentivizing specific
behaviors on the part of law enforcement officers. As Anthony
Amsterdam presaged, a plausible reason for this doctrinal trajectory is
that legislatures have been largely absent from the creation of the most
115. See supra Part I.B.
116. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure
and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 17 (1997).
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significant criminal procedure protections that have been developed since
the 1960s.
17
When a constitutional criminal procedure case involves statutory
interpretation, however, the Supreme Court tends to engage in a far less
regulatory mode of decisionmaking. In United States v. Salerno,"I8 for
example, the Court upheld a provision of the Bail Reform Act119
authorizing the pretrial detention of defendants in cases where no
combination of release conditions "will reasonably assure ... the safety
of any other person and the community.' 20 Rejecting a substantive due
process challenge to this statute, the Court recognized that pretrial
detention implicated a fundamental right to liberty but held that the Bail
Reform Act was adequately tailored to advance a "legitimate and
compelling" governmental interest.12 ' Because of the famously mercurial
nature of its substantive due process doctrine, the Court had considerable
intellectual freedom to articulate whatever protections it thought
appropriate to safeguard the liberty interest it identified.122 For example,
the Court could have suggested that pretrial detention is categorically
appropriate in any case where the defendant has a record suggesting he
117. See supra note 4; see also WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 76 (2011) [hereinafter STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE] ("Elected state
legislators and members of Congress write criminal codes and sentencing rules.
Procedure is governed by judges-not just the politician judges who staff state courts, but
the appointed, life-tenured judges and Justices who sit on the federal bench"). Stuntz
argues that legislatures' absence from criminal procedure, and focus on substantive
criminal law, can be attributed to the regulatory nature of constitutional criminal
procedure doctrine. See STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE, supra, at 76; William J. Stuntz, The
Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARv. L. REV. 780,
791-807 (2006). One does not have to accept Stuntz's causal claims, however, to
conclude that legislatures' reluctance to create criminal procedure rules has encouraged
the Court to produce broad regulatory constitutional doctrines. Cf Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH. L. REv. 1045,
1073-79 (2013) (reviewing STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE, supra) (challenging Stuntz's causal
claims about the effect of constitutional criminal procedure doctrine on legislative
behavior).
118. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
119. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-50 (2012).
120. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742 (quoting § 3142(e)(1)).
121. Id. at 750. More precisely, the Court held that the Bail Reform Act's
detention provision did not violate substantive due process because: (1) Congress did not
"expressly intended to impose punitive restrictions," (2) an "alternative purpose to
which" the statute "may rationally be connected is assignable for it," and (3) the statute's
provisions are not "excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it." Id. at
747 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
122. See, e.g., Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th
Cir. 1988) (contending that the "concept" of substantive due process "invests judges with
an uncanalized discretion to invalidate federal and state legislation").
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or she presents a flight risk or a public danger.123 The Court, however,
deferred to the regulatory structure that Congress constructed to protect
the right and held that the safeguards in the Bail Reform Act were both
sufficient and necessary to protect a defendant's pretrial liberty interest
in noncapital cases.124 Thus, rather than construct its own rules to
regulate the conduct of trial courts making bail determinations (as the
doctrinal freedom of the substantive due process right could have
plausibly allowed it to do), the Court entrusted those regulatory
determinations to the legislature.
Beyond Salerno, recent Fourth Amendment cases governing new
technologies offer particularly striking comparative examples of how
statutory interpretation constrains decisionmaking in constitutional
criminal procedure cases. Relative to other areas of criminal procedure,
Congress is relatively active in creating investigative rules governing the
use of new technologies.125 Additionally, as Orin Kerr has persuasively
argued, federal appellate courts have consistently relied on the federal
Wiretap Act 126 to define the scope of the Fourth Amendment's
protections with respect to technological surveillance within the United
States.127 Likewise, in cases involving the wiretapping of American
123. For example, the Colorado Constitution has been interpreted to require
judges to deny bail to suspects arrested for capital crimes. See People v. Dist. Court, 529
P.2d 1335, 1335-36 (Colo. 1974) (en banc). Traditionally, however, states have
permitted courts the discretion to grant bail in such cases. See O'Rourke, supra note 68,
at 2210-12.
124. Specifically, the Court identified the Act's safeguards-which include a
"full-blown adversary hearing" in which "the Government must convince a neutral
decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can
reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person"--as creating the "narrow
circumstances" in which the Government's "interest in crime prevention was at its
greatest." Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750. It is under these circumstances, the Court held, that
the Government interest at stake is "sufficiently weighty" for a defendant's substantive
due process right to "be subordinated to the greater needs of society." Id. at 750-51.
Elsewhere in its opinion, however, the Court identified a possible exception to the need
for individualized bail determinations by stating in dicta that "[a] court may ... refuse
bail in capital cases." Id. at 750.
125. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 807, 839-56
(2004) (arguing that "criminal investigations in developing technologies have tended to
be governed by statute").
126. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2012).
127. See Kerr, supra note 125, at 852-54; see also Clapper v. Amnesty Intern.,
U.S.A., 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) (holding that attorneys and human rights, labor,
legal, and media organizations lacked standing to challenge the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA)). Notably, the Federal Wiretap Act was patterned on the holding
in Berger v. New York, 381 U.S. 41 (1965). See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 4.6(b) (3d ed. 2013). The statute thus illustrates an important dialectic
between courts and legislatures in the process of constitutional regulation.
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citizens in foreign countries, courts have generally held that the
constitutionality of the search rested on whether the wiretapping
conformed to the statutory law of the country in which it occurred.28
Similarly, in King, the Court held that the statutory protections contained
in Maryland's DNA Collection Act were sufficient to protect the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.129 Absent from the Court's
analysis, however, was any additional direction to police departments or
legislatures about safeguards that might better ensure that officers acted
within the scope of the Fourth Amendment when obtaining post-arrest
DNA samples.130 Thus, like the appellate courts that Kerr examines, the
Supreme Court in King relied on the legislature to establish a regulatory
framework that adequately protects suspects' Fourth Amendment rights
in a relatively new technological field.
At the same time, in cases involving new technologies where no
statute is at issue, the Supreme Court has been quite willing to engage in
a more regulatory mode of decisionmaking. In Florida v. Harris,'31 for
example, the Supreme Court held that a police officer had probable cause
to search a vehicle based on signals he received from a drug-sniffing
dog-a policing tool that is aptly characterized as a biotechnology.132 In
approving the search in question, the Supreme Court purported to
disavow the use of "rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic
inquiries" in determining whether a search was supported by probable
cause.13 3 In practice, however, the Court set forth detailed guidance as to
the steps that a police department should take to ensure that their use of
drug-sniffing dogs passes constitutional muster:
[E]vidence of a dog's satisfactory performance in a
certification or training program can itself provide sufficient
reason to trust his alert. If a bona fide organization has certified
a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a court
can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that
the dog's alert provides probable cause to search. The same is
true, even in the absence of formal certification, if the dog has
recently and successfully completed a training program that
evaluated his proficiency in locating drugs....
128. Kerr, supra note 125, at 854.
129. Marylandv. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979-80 (2013).
130. See King, 133 S. Ct. 1958.
131. 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013).
132. Id. at 1059; see also Braverman, supra note 12, at 85 (characterizing K-9
sniffs as biotechnology).
133. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1055.
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A defendant, however, must have an opportunity to
challenge such evidence of a dog's reliability, whether by
cross-examining the testifying officer or by introducing his
own fact or expert witnesses. The defendant, for example, may
contest the adequacy of a certification or training program,
perhaps asserting that its standards are too lax or its methods
faulty. So too, the defendant may examine how the dog (or
handler) performed in the assessments made in those settings.
Indeed, evidence of the dog's (or handler's) history in the field,
although susceptible to the kind of misinterpretation we have
discussed, may sometimes be relevant .... 
134
Thus, in two biotechnology cases decided during the same
Term-one involving a statute and one in which a statute was
absent-the Court took very different approaches to its use of doctrine as
a mechanism for governing police conduct.
Another recent new technology case that may be usefully contrasted
to King is Riley v. California,135  which also addressed the
constitutionality of search incident to a lawful arrest.136 In Riley, the
Court unanimously held that police must generally obtain a warrant
before searching an arrested suspect's cell phone.137 In addition to
imposing this directive on police officers, the Court delineated potential
scenarios in which officers would not be expected to obtain a warrant
due to the exigencies of the situation, such as "a suspect texting an
accomplice who, it is feared, is preparing to detonate a bomb, or a child
abductor who may have information about the child's location on his cell
phone.,138 The Court thus provided far more detailed regulatory guidance
than was necessary to decide the merits of the case. It hereby adopted a
divergent approach in Riley and Harris on one hand, and King on the
other, to analyzing the Fourth Amendment's application to new
technologies. This divergence suggests that, in evaluating a court's
decision-making style in such cases, the salient variable is not the
technology itself, but whether there exists a statute or regulation
governing how that technology is used.
134. Id. at 1057-58.
135. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
136. Id. at 2480.
137. Id. at 2485.
138. Id. at 2494.
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2. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Beyond the realm of criminal procedure, the Supreme Court's
affirmative action jurisprudence offers two particularly interesting
examples of the role of statutory constraint in shaping the outcomes of
constitutional cases.3 9 In Regents of University of California v. Bakke,
140
the Court invalidated the UC Davis School of Medicine's affirmative
action plan, which prescribed that a certain number of spots in an
entering class would be reserved for minority candidates who were
selected through a special admissions program.141 This admissions plan
was not governed by a statute or regulation, and a majority of the Justices
concluded that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act did not prohibit any racial
classifications that were otherwise permitted under the Equal Protection
Clause.142 Thus, a majority of the Court treated Bakke as an equal
protection case that did not involve textual review.
43
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke-the reasoning of which the
Court subsequently endorsed in Grutter v. Bollinger'"44-presents a clear
example of regulatory decisionmaking. First, Justice Powell held that
strict scrutiny would apply to the UC Davis special admissions program
notwithstanding that the program's racial classifications were designed to
benefit historically subordinated minorities. 45 In selecting this standard
of review, Justice Powell rejected the influential (and, at the time,
doctrinally viable) antisubordination theory of equal protection,
according to which a less exacting standard of scrutiny should apply to
racial classifications that are designed to remedy, rather than perpetuate,
the subordinated status of a historically disadvantaged group.146 The
Court thus adopted a standard of review that it plausibly could have
rejected and thereby gave itself a great degree of regulatory control over
lower courts and nonjudicial officials.147 This decision to apply strict
139. I am grateful to Bertrall Ross for suggesting these examples.
140. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
141. See id. at 269-70.
142. Id. at 281-87; id at 328-55 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
143. Cf id at 412-421 (Stevens., J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (concluding that the UC Davis special admissions program violated
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act).
144. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
145. Bakke, 483 U.S. at 295-97.
146. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1470, 1532-37 (2004)
(arguing for the doctrinal viability of the antisubordination theory in the context of
Bakke). For a classic articulation of the antisubordination theory of equal protection, see
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).
147. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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scrutiny is perhaps better explained by Justice Powell's substantive view
on equal protection than by the absence of a statute. The remainder of his
analysis, however, further supports the hypothesis that statutes impose
meaningful constraint on constitutional decisionmaking.
Two features of Justice Powell's analysis are particularly striking.
The first concerns Justice Powell's analysis of whether the medical
school articulated a compelling state interest for its admissions program.
UC Davis argued that its special admissions program was necessary to
counter the historical effects of racial discrimination in medical schools
and the medical profession.148 Justice Powell acknowledged the
theoretical legitimacy of this goal.'49 However, he concluded that it was
inappropriate to assume that such historical discrimination existed "in the
absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violation."' 50 In Powell's view, "isolated
segments of our vast governmental structures are not competent" to
identify such constitutional and statutory violations, "at least in the
absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria."' 51
Thus, Justice Powell's opinion suggests that if neither a legislature nor an
agency has chosen to address historical discrimination in a profession,
then a university is not able to do so unless a court has played some role
in the regulatory process.
Second, in addition to deciding that UC Davis's special admissions
program was unconstitutional, Justice Powell provided detailed guidance
as to how universities could construct an acceptable affirmative action
policy. Specifically, Justice Powell decided that the medical school had a
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.152 However, he
concluded that, in reserving places for minority applicants, the medical
school had not chosen the least restrictive means to attain this goal.
53
Justice Powell then proceeded to offer a laudatory and relatively detailed
description of Harvard College's admission policy, according to which
an applicant's racial identity may count as a "plus" as long as all
applicants competed for all available seats.54 Justice Powell's opinion
also included an appendix that comprehensively described Harvard's
admissions policy, 5 5 thereby giving public universities detailed guidance
on how to construct an affirmative action program that was
148. Bakke, 483 U.S. at 305.
149. Id. at 307.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 309.
152. Id. at 311-12.
153. Id. at 315.
154. Id. at316-18.
155. Id. at 321-24.
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constitutionally permissible. Notably, as the Court emphasized in Grutter
v. Bollinger when upholding the University of Michigan Law School's
affirmative action policy: "Justice Powell's opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court has served as the touchstone for constitutional
analysis of race-conscious admissions policies. Public and private
universities across the Nation have modeled their own admissions
programs on Justice Powell's views on permissible race-conscious
policies. ' 56 By upholding the University of Michigan's admissions
policy in Grutter, the Court rewarded the university's reliance on Justice
Powell's regulatory framework in Bakke.
157
By contrast, in a recent affirmative action case involving textual
review, the Court took a particularly nonregulatory approach to its
decisionmaking. In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,
158
the Court upheld a state constitutional provision that barred Michigan's
public universities from adopting race-conscious admissions policies.
159
In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed the narrowness of its
holding, emphasizing that the case was "not about the constitutionality,
or the merits, of race-conscious admissions policies in higher
education."'' 60 The Supreme Court then addressed BAMN's argument
that the constitutional provision was impermissible under Washington v.
Seattle School Dist. No. 1,161 which struck down a state statute that
prohibited school boards from implementing race-conscious busing
programs for the purpose of integrating school districts. Seattle held that
the anti-busing statute violated the Equal Protection Clause on the
ground that it "use[d] the racial nature of an issue to define the
governmental decision-making structure, and thus impose[d] substantial
156. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003).
157. Specifically, in Bakke, Justice Powell held that universities may not use
affirmative action to redress past racial discrimination "in the absence of legislative
mandates and legislatively determined criteria," 438 U.S. at 309, but acknowledged that
"the attainment of a diverse student body" is a "constitutionally permissible goal for an
institution of higher education" to pursue through appropriately tailored measures. Id. at
311-12. Consistent with this rationale, the Grutter Court endorsed the University of
Michigan Law School's use of a race-conscious admissions policy as narrowly tailored to
the constitutionally permissible goal of attaining a diverse student body. See 539 U.S. at
328-43. In doing so, the Court emphasized the degree to which the law school's policy
provided for the type of individualized consideration of merit that Justice Powell
endorsed in Bakke. See id. at 333-36; cf Berger, Individual Rights, supra note 72, at
2031-32, 2040-42 (arguing that a tension exists between the Grutter Court's deference to
the university's admissions policy decisions and Justice Powell's analysis in Bakke).
158. 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
159. Id. at 1638.
160. Id. at 1630.
161. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
2015:87
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
and unique burdens on racial minorities.' 62 While the Court's analysis in
Seattle was lengthy, it was nonregulatory in that it did not seek to
provide detailed guidance as to how a state could repeal an
antidiscrimination statute without running afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause.163 Still, the Court offered some guidance to legislatures by stating
that the statute was flawed because it "burden[ed] all future attempts to
integrate Washington schools in districts throughout the State[] by
lodging decision-making authority over the question at a new and remote
level of government."'64
In Schuette, however, the Court went on to disavow the arguably
regulatory dimensions of Seattle's reasoning. Instead, the Court adopted
a remarkably narrow reading of Seattle based on assumptions that were
not articulated in that opinion. Specifically, in Schuette, the Court
rejected what it characterized as a "broad reading of Seattle," according
to which "any state action with a 'racial focus' that makes it 'more
difficult for certain racial minorities than for other groups' to 'achieve
legislation that is in their interest' is subject to strict scrutiny.,'165 The
actual constitutional flaw of the Washington statute, the Schuette Court
reasoned, was only that it reversed a busing program that the school
district had likely implemented to remedy intentional racial
segregation.66 Accordingly, the Court adopted a nonregulatory doctrinal
rule that prohibited lower courts from finding that racial minorities had
any collective political interests that it was unconstitutional for the
majority to threaten.
167
To be sure, Schuette and Bakke raise different constitutional
questions relating to affirmative action. However, the fact that both cases
162. Id. at 470.
163. Cf id. at 483 (acknowledging that 'the simple repeal or modification of
desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed as
embodying a presumptively invalid racial classification' (quoting Crawford v. L.A. Bd.
of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 539 (1982))).
164. Id.
165. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634 (quoting Seattle, 458 U.S. at 470, 474 (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
166. Id. at 1633. The Court supported this assumption regarding the purpose of
the Washington statute by appealing to Justice Breyer's dissent in Seattle. Id. (citing
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 807-08 (Breyer J.,
dissenting)). Notably, the Seattle Court did not make any explicit finding that the
Washington statute was designed to remedy de jure segregation. Id. at 1625 (citing
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720-21).
167. See id. at 1634 ("[T]his Court has rejected the assumption that 'members of
the same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the
community in which they live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will
prefer the same candidates at the polls."' (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647
(1993))).
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are about affirmative action suggests that they have similar degrees of
political salience, and that it is therefore worthwhile to consider how the
presence or absence of a statute affected the Court's decisionmaking in
each case. In terms of outcomes, the decisions in Schuette and Bakke
both make it more difficult for educational institutions to enact
affirmative action policies. In terms of reasoning, however, Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke stands in sharp contrast to the Court's analysis
in Schuette. In Bakke, Justice Powell provided guidance that incentivized
educational institutions to develop specific race-conscious admissions
policies.168 This opinion provided a template for more recent, and equally
regulatory, opinions upholding educational affirmative action policies in
cases that did not involve textual review.169 In Schuette, by contrast, the
Court expressly disavowed a regulatory role in the affirmative action
debate and held "that the courts may not disempower the voters from
choosing which path to follow" with regard to race-conscious
educational policies.170 Although judicial ideology is undoubtedly a
driving force in each opinion, it would appear that the presence of a
statute at least correlates with very different modes of decisionmaking in
each case.
3. PROTECTED SPEECH AND BUFFER ZONES
The First Amendment provides a wealth of cases that raise similar
constitutional questions but differ with regard to whether a statute is at
issue. Compare, for example, four cases addressing "buffer zones" that
restrict protests outside abortion clinics, two of which involve textual
review.71 and two of which do not.17 2 In Madsen v. Women's Health
Center,'73 the Court's "buffer zone" jurisprudence began with the review
of an injunction, rather than a statute, and this beginning appears to have
significantly influenced the trajectory of the doctrine. In Madsen, the
Court examined a district court order enjoining antiabortion protesters
"from blocking or interfering with public access to the clinic, and from
physically abusing persons entering or leaving the clinic.' ' 174 That the
case involved an injunction, rather than a generally applicable statute,
168. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
169. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
170. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1635.
171. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703 (2000).
172. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. NY, 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
173. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
174. Id. at 758.
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was relevant to the Court's choice to apply intermediate scrutiny.
Specifically, the Court recognized that injunctions "carry greater risks of
censorship and discriminatory application than do general ordinances,"
and thus merit a higher standard of scrutiny than is applied to a
"content-neutral, generally applicable statute.' 75 However, the Court
further concluded that the injunction was itself content neutral, and hence
that strict scrutiny did not apply, because the order was issued to regulate
a group who "repeatedly violated the [district] court's original order."
'176
Thus, the fact that Madsen concerned an injunction triggered a
standard of review that gave the court greater ability to influence and
monitor the actions of lower courts that are charged with regulating
buffer zones.177 The Court then used this discretion to offer detailed
guidance to trial courts as to how they might craft constitutionally
permissible injunctions (and, by extension, to police departments that are
charged with establishing policies to regulate protests in the absence of
any statutory guidance).1 78 In a subsequent nonlegislative buffer zone
case, Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York,179 the Court
provided similarly detailed guidance by striking down parts of an
injunction establishing a 15-foot floating buffer zone around patients and
their vehicles80 and upholding a part of the injunction establishing a
fixed buffer zone around the entranceways of the clinic.' 8' Significantly,
the Court further held that although the government was not a party to
the case, the injunction was justified by concern for public safety-a
rationale that, as Justice Scalia observed in dissent, gave courts
considerable flexibility to craft detailed, speech-restrictive rules to
175. Id. at 764. Specifically, the Court held that the proper First Amendment
inquiry for content-neutral injunctions is "whether the challenged provisions of the
injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government
interest." Id. at 765.
176. Id. at 763; see also id. (concluding that it was irrelevant that "the
group whose conduct violated the court's order happen to share the same opinion
regarding abortions being performed at the clinic").
177. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
178. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768-71, 773-75. Specifically, in Madsen, the Court
upheld parts of the district court injunction imposing a 36-foot buffer zone around
entranceways of a clinic, and prohibiting protestors from making noise within earshot of
the clinic during business hours. Id. at 768-71. However, it invalidated parts of the
injunction that prohibited protestors from displaying images observable to patients within
the clinic, established a floating buffer zone prohibiting protesters from approaching
patients within 300 feet of the clinic, and enjoined protestors from picketing within 300
feet of the residences of clinic staff. Id. at 773-75.
179. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
180. Id. at 377-80.
181. Id.at380-81.
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advance goals that go beyond the interests of the parties to a case.
1
12
Thus, the fact that both Schenck and Madsen involved injunctions caused
the Court to adopt a more searching standard of review than it would
have applied if the cases concerned content-neutral statutes and to
endorse detailed, judge-made rules to regulate political protests.
The Court's analyses in its next two statutory buffer-zone cases
were certainly influenced by the holdings of Madsen and Schenck, but
were less regulatory in nature. In Hill v. Colorado,183 the Court reached
an outcome similar to those in the prior cases but was somewhat less
prescriptive in its regulatory guidance.!84 The statute in Hill established
an eight-foot floating buffer zone within 100 feet of an abortion clinic
and was thus similar to (albeit seven feet smaller than) the buffer zone
that was invalidated in Schenck.185 The Court, however, concluded that
the statute was content neutral' 6 and upheld the statute as being
narrowly tailored to "significant and legitimate" governmental
interests.1 87 Although the differences between the buffer zones in Hill
and Schenck were relatively minor, the Court engaged in a less
regulatory mode of decisionmaking when the constitutional question
before it involved a statute. Granted, in concluding that the Colorado
statute was narrowly tailored, the Court in Hill observed that it permitted
protesters to "communicate at a normal conversational distance,"
allowed them to remain in one place even if others came within an
eight-foot range, and enabled them to silently distribute leaflets.
188
Beyond this analysis, however, the Court provided little information that
would guide police officers seeking to enforce the statute or legislatures
seeking to enact similar (but not identical) statutes. Moreover, in Hill, the
182. See id. at 392-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
184. Id.
185. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 707 (observing that the Colorado statute barred
protesters from approaching within eight feet of a person "for the purpose of passing a
leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or
counseling with such other person" (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999))).
186. See id. at 719 (invoking Madsen as grounds for accepting the Colorado
Supreme Court's conclusion that the buffer zone statute's "restrictions apply equally to
all demonstrators, regardless of viewpoint, and the statutory language makes no reference
to the content of the speech" (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf id. at 742-49
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing based on the statute's language and context that it
imposed a viewpoint-based restriction on the speech of abortion protestors).
187. Id. at 725. The Court distinguished the Colorado statute from the
unconstitutional buffer zone in Schenck on the grounds that the Colorado buffer zone
contains a mens rea requirement, allows speakers to "remain in one place," and "permits
the speaker to communicate at a 'normal conversational distance."' Id. at 726-27
(quoting Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377).
188. Id. at 726-27 (quoting Schenck, 519 U.S. at 377).
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Court referred to the structural protections that inhere in a generally
applicable statute as grounds for upholding it. Specifically, in rejecting
an overbreadth challenge to the Colorado statute, the Court reasoned that
"the comprehensiveness of the statute is a virtue, not a vice, because it is
evidence against there being a discriminatory governmental motive. '8 9
Thus, the decision in Hill is a rare instance in which the Court expressly
acknowledged that the presence or absence of a statute is significant to
its constitutional decisionmaking.
However, the Court's most recent buffer zone case illustrates that,
while statutes might constrain constitutional decisionmaking to some
degree, these constraints are imperfect. In McCullen v. Coakley,'90 the
Court struck down a Massachusetts statute establishing a fixed buffer
zone that barred anyone's presence within 35 feet of an abortion clinic
unless they fell under an enumerated exception (including exceptions for
clinic employees and passersby).'91 As it did in Hill, the Court
determined that the statute was content neutral and therefore not subject
to strict scrutiny.192 In this respect, the Court deprived itself of a doctrinal
tool that offers it a high degree of regulatory control over lower courts
and nonjudicial officials.193 In other respects, however, McCullen's
reasoning is more regulatory in nature than Hill's, if less regulatory than
Schenck's or Madsen's. In declaring that the statute in McCullen was
content neutral, the Court suggested that protesters would have a viable
constitutional claim if police officers chose not to enforce the Act against
clinic employees who acted outside the scope of their employment and
expressed favorable views about abortion.!94 Moreover, the Court
concluded that the statute was not narrowly tailored in part because it
prevented protesters from distributing leaflets to clinic visitors and from
engaging visitors in one-on-one conversations without raising their
voice.'
95
189. Id. at 731. Quoting Justice Jackson, the Court went on to explain that "there
is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government
than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority
must be imposed generally." Id. at 731 (quoting Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York,
306 U.S. 106, 112 (Jackson, J., concurring)). Likewise, in Madsen, the Court invoked
Justice Jackson's observations to conclude that a greater degree of scrutiny is warranted
when reviewing the constitutionality of an injunction than when examining a comparable
statute. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1994).
190. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
191. See id at 2525; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 120EY2(b) (West 2012).
192. See McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2530-34.
193. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
194. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2533-34.
195. Id. at 2535-37.
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Thus, while the Court failed to offer the sort of detailed information
it provided in Madsen and Schenck as to the precise perimeter of a buffer
zone that is constitutionally acceptable, it still provided some degree of
regulatory guidance. There are, however, two possible explanations for
the regulatory aspects of McCullen that are consistent with the idea that
statutes impose some constraint on decisionmaking. First, the Court's
buffer zone jurisprudence began with two cases that did not involve
statutes, and the principle of stare decisis forced the Court to engage
with the regulatory aspects of those decisions in order to resolve the
statutory cases.196 The buffer zone cases thus suggest hat the sequence of
cases will influence constitutional doctrine based on whether the initial
cases involve statutory interpretation.
Second, while Hill involved a facial challenge to a buffer zone
statute, 197 McCullen involved both facial and as-applied challenges.'98 To
resolve the as-applied challenge, the district court conducted a bench trial
that generated a substantial factual record concerning the experiences of
the police officers charged with enforcing the buffer zone, the clinic
employees, and the plaintiff-protesters.99 Thus, the Court's attention was
largely focused on the facts of the case before it rather than on the statute
at issue. This suggests that although as-applied challenges will impose
some degree of statutory constraint on a court's decisionmaking, the
degree will vary depending on the extent to which the Court is focused
on the facts before it.
200
4. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
If criminal procedure is a field in which textual review is the
exception, intellectual property is one in which it is the rule. As
Shyamkrishna Balganesh has observed, there is no question that
Congress plays the dominant role in determining "intellectual property's
precise content and coverage.'2 ' Copyright law, for example, is codified
by a federal statutory framework that Congress established with the
196. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723 (1998) (offering a normative defense of stare
decisis); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 579-88 (1987) (analyzing
the ways in which precedential reasoning may constrain judicial outcomes).
197. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 708 (2000).
198. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2528.
199. Id. at 2525-28.
200. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
201. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law
Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REv. 1543, 1544 (2010).
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Copyright Act of 1790202 and has since modified with relative
frequency.2 °3 However, in addition to the federal statutory frameworks
governing intellectual property, there is a substantial body of state
court-made intellectual property law known as "common law intellectual
property.,204 For example, the right of publicity, which grants individuals
an ownership interest in their name and likeness,20 5 gradually arose from
the common law of torts.20 6 Some states continue to recognize the right
as a matter of common law, while many have codified a statutory cause
of action for the right.207 Even in those states that have enacted statutory
publicity rights, however, courts frequently disregard the statutes and
elaborate upon the right incrementally and in common-law fashion.2 °8
Significantly, these contrasting intellectual property
regimes--copyright and the right of publicity-suggest that the
phenomenon of statutory constraint is not unique to the Supreme Court
or, for that matter, to federal courts. Both of these regimes implicate, and
often exist in tension with, the First Amendment's freedom of expression
guarantee.209 Each regime authorizes judges to bar individuals from
202. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, repealed by Copyright Act of
1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 101-122 (2011)).
203. See, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see also Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194-96 (2003) (summarizing congressional interventions in
copyright law from the Copyright Act of 1790 through the Copyright Term Extension
Act (CTEA) of 1998).
204. Balganesh, supra note 201, at 1544 (quoting Douglass G. Baird, Common
Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associated
Press, 50 CHI. L. REV. 411,411 (1983)).
205. See Toffoloni v. LFP Publ'g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1205 (lth Cir.
2009) (defining the right of publicity "as [an individual's] right to the exclusive use of his
or her name and likeness" (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v.
Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Ga. 1982))).
206. Balganesh, supra note 201, at 1556.
207. Id. at 1558; see also Jennifer L. Carpenter, Internet Publication: The Case
for an Expanded Right of Publicity for Non-Celebrities, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 58
nn.24-25 (2001) (listing states with common law sources for the right of publicity and
states that recognize the right by statute).
208. Balganesh, supra note 201, at 1556; see, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125
F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1997) ("We have held that th[e] common-law right of publicity
protects more than the knowing use of a plaintiff's name or likeness for commercial
purposes that is protected by Cal. Civ. Code § 3344. It also protects against
appropriations of the plaintiffs identity by other means."); Jennifer E. Rothman,
Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 199, 265 (2002)
(commenting on the potential negative consequences of expanding rights of publicity).
209. Significant contributions to the massive literature on this topic include:
Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the
Copyright Extension Act Is Unconstitutional, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 83 (2002); Alan E.
Garfield, The First Amendment as a Check on Copyright Rights, 23 HASTINGS COMM. &
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certain forms of expression and to impose liability on those individuals
for having engaged in such expression.210 However, as Mark
Bartholomew and John Tehranian recently showed, courts have adopted
dramatically divergent approaches to the First Amendment concerns that
arise in intellectual property and right of publicity cases.21' Indeed,
Bartholomew and Tehranian persuasively defend a thesis which goes
even further than the one this Article proposes: that courts not only
undertake different modes of constitutional analysis in copyright and
right of publicity cases, but that this divergence results in different
doctrinal outcomes.212
In the statute-dominated regime of copyright, courts tend to uphold
congressional policy choices regarding the scope of defendants'
expressive rights and accordingly have declined to develop robust
doctrinal protections for these rights. Specifically, the Supreme Court has
held that, like the First Amendment, "copyright's purpose is to promote
the creation and publication of free expression.213 Accordingly, in two
recent cases rejecting First Amendment challenges to the Copyright Act,
the Supreme Court stressed that the Act contains two "built-in First
Amendment accommodations.,214  First, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
"distinguishes between ideas and expression and makes only the latter
eligible for copyright protection."215 Second, the "fair use" defense
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 "allows the public to use not only facts and
ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in
certain circumstances.'216 In light of these "speech-protective purposes
and safeguards," the Supreme Court declined to apply First Amendment
ENT. L.J. 587 (2001); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REv.
1057 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1 (2001); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair
Use, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1987); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination:
Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 5-12 (2002).
210. See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 5, at 8.
211. Id. at 54-60. Bartholomew and Tehranian also analyze courts' treatment of
First Amendment concerns in trademark law and, in the respects relevant to this Article,
find that it more closely resembles the approach taken in copyright cases than in right of
publicity cases. See id. at 57-58. For economy's sake, this Article will not recapitulate
their analysis of trademark law.
212. Id. at3.
213. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); accord Golan v. Holder, 132
S. Ct. 873, 889-90 (2012); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S.
539, 558 (1985).
214. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219); see also Harper
& Row, 471 U.S. at 560.




scrutiny to any legislation that does not "alter[] the traditional contours
of copyright protection" that are embodied in the Copyright Act.217
In light of these holdings, copyright law appears to lock courts into
a statutory framework for analyzing First Amendment questions that
limits their "ability to give independent consideration to speech-related
defenses.2 18 For example, the fair use defense-one of copyright law's
"built-in First Amendment accommodations"219  was codified in
1976.220 As Bartholomew and Tehranian have observed, "[t]his
codification ha[d] consequences.,22  The statute requires judges to
consider four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature . .. ; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
222
As courts have recognized, the language of 17 U.S.C. § 107 does
not prohibit judges from considering additional factors relevant to
whether to recognize a fair use defense.223 However, courts rarely
consider factors beyond those enumerated in the statute.224 Regardless of
whether the statutory framework of copyright is ultimately sufficient to
protect defendants' expressive interests,225 it at least correlates with a
mode of constitutional adjudication in which courts decline to announce
broadly regulatory constitutional rules.226
217. Id. at219,221.
218. Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 5, at 74.
219. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560).
220. See Act for the General Revision of the Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553,
§ 107, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012)).
221. Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 5, at 74.
222. § 107.
223. See, e.g., Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 2003) ("These factors
are not meant to be exclusive, but rather illustrative, representing only general guidance
about the sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly have found to be fair
uses." (citations and internal quotations omitted)).
224. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use
Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 563 (2008).
225. Cf Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright
After Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. REv. 1082, 1086 (2013) (arguing that the Golan's
holding can be interpreted as offering a robust conception of the First Amendment
protections embodied in the Copyright Act).
226. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
560 (1985) ("In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the
Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable xpression and uncopyrightable facts
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In right of publicity cases, by contrast, courts routinely operate in a
regulatory manner to construct "expansive new defenses for expressive
appropriations of celebrity.,2 7 For example, in Comedy III Productions,
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,228 the California Supreme Court held that an
artist sued for a right-of-publicity violation may raise an affirmative First
Amendment defense.229 Although the case involved California's statutory
right of publicity,230 the court drew upon an earlier, concurring opinion in
a common law case to recognize that the right may threaten a defendant's
expressive rights.23' The court then established a detailed test for
balancing plaintiffs' rights of publicity and defendants' expressive
interest:
[T]he inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is one of the
"raw materials" from which an original work is synthesized, or
whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very
sum and substance of the work in question. We ask, in other
words, whether a product containing a celebrity's likeness is so
transformed that it has become primarily the defendant's own
expression rather than the celebrity's likeness.232
In a subsequent right-of-publicity case, Winter v. DC Comics,233 the
California Supreme Court made clear that this test was to be applied in a
robust manner.234 Specifically, the court held that the First Amendment
protected DC Comics against liability for a thinly veiled, satirical
depiction of two rock musicians, Johnny and Edgar Winter, as the
"half-worm" villains of a comic book series.235 This use of the Winter
and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use,
we see no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a
public figure exception to copyright.").
227. Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 5, at 86.
228. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
229. Id. at 810.
230. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 990 (West 1998), renumbered and amended by Stats.
1999, c. 998 (S.B. 209), § 1 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2012)).
231. See Comedy 111, 21 P.3d at 803 ("[T]he very importance of celebrities in
society means that the right of publicity has the potential of censoring significant
expression by suppressing alternative versions of celebrity images that are iconoclastic,
irreverent, or otherwise attempt to redefine the celebrity's meaning. ... 'The right of
publicity derived from public prominence does not confer a shield to ward off caricature,
parody and satire. Rather, prominence invites creative comment."' (quoting Guglielmi v.
Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring))).
232. Id. at 809.
233. 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
234. See id. at 478-79.
235. See id. at 476.
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brothers' personae, the court concluded, was sufficiently transformative
under the test set forth in Comedy 111.
236
Comedy III and Winter thus illustrate that regulatory
decisionmaking is more likely to occur in cases that nominally involve
textual review but where the statutory text is not an object of the court's
attention. In some areas of law, there are statutes which putatively
govern the field but which are so indefinite or antiquated in their
guidance that courts do not rely upon the statutory text to resolve the
cases before them.237 Strictly speaking, the courts in Comedy III and
Winter were addressing a right that was codified in statute. The statute in
question, however, is one that incorporated a common law concept; and
these common law origins appear to have led courts to freely elaborate
upon, or even disregard, the language that legislatures used to codify the
238right. Accordingly, as Bartholomew and Tehranian argue, "the
common law's hospitability to searching inquiries as to the overarching
concerns behind a particular legal right distinguishes it from statutory
lawmaking and can fuel greater consideration of First Amendment
interests., 239 These scholars thus touch on a phenomenon that is not
specific to the domain of intellectual property: regulatory
decisionmaking in constitutional cases where courts do not engage with a
statutory or regulatory text.
III. STRUCTURAL REASONS FOR STATUTORY CONSTRAINTS
Superficially, it may seem puzzling that courts would engage in
different modes of constitutional decisionmaking in textual and
nontextual review cases. Often, the fact that a case involves statutory
interpretation will not be directly relevant to the constitutional question
that the court is facing. (The DNA collection at issue in Maryland v.
King, for example, would presumably have been upheld regardless
whether or not it was conducted pursuant to a statute.)240 What's more, I
do not wish to suggest-and, indeed, highly doubt-that judges regard
themselves as engaging in a fundamentally different mode of analysis
when reviewing the constitutionality of a statute than when reviewing the
constitutionality of an executive action.
236. See id. at 479-80.
237. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom
and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 808 (1983) (citing the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), as a statute for which case law, rather than statutory text, is
typically the starting point for analysis).
238. See supra notes 202-08 and accompanying text.
239. Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 5, at 73; see also Balganesh, supra
note 201, at 1547-50.
240. See supra Part II.
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Indeed, if judges consciously felt bound to a less regulatory form of
decisionmaking in textual review cases, then they would have a powerful
incentive to strategically omit any mention of a statute when they wished
to engage in regulatory decisionmaking. In a nontextual review case, a
court may be reviewing actions that were governed by a statute which the
court simply did not interpret in the course of deciding the case.24 1
Accordingly, it would be possible for a court to reframe a constitutional
issue as one that involves nontextual review if it wished to exercise a
greater degree of control over state officials.242
In practice, however, it does not appear that courts typically engage
in this kind of rhetorical gamesmanship. To evaluate the degree to which
such strategizing occurs, a research assistant and I examined the parties'
merits briefs and the court's certiorari orders for each of the case pairs
discussed in Part II of this Article.243 For these materials, we checked
whether the court framed any of the cases as involving nontextual review
when the parties presented it as involving textual review, or as involving
textual review when the parties presented it as involving nontextual
review. In none of the cases did the court treat the case as involving
nontextual review if the petitioner did not frame it as such, nor did the
court treat the case as involving textual review if it was not so presented.
This preliminary review certainly does not rule out the possibility that
courts will strategically ignore a statute's presence when engaging in
regulatory decisionmaking, but it does suggest hat statutes might impose
a meaningful constraint on courts' decisionmaking.
Indeed, there are a number of structural features of textual review
that are likely to shape the manner in which courts decide constitutional
cases. Moreover, these structural features will influence judicial
decisionmaking regardless of the level of respect the judiciary accords,
241. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
242. Cf Kevin T. McGuire & Barbara Palmer, Issue Fluidity on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 691 (1995) (analyzing the Supreme Court's power
to "create" constitutional questions that differ from those which the litigants presented).
243. For the following cases we examined the certiorari petitions as well as the
certiorari orders and parties' merits briefs: McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014);
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative
Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013); Florida v.
Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Eldred v. Ashcrofi, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N. Y, 519 U.S. 357
(1997); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739 (1987); Comedy 111 Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal.
2001). For the remaining cases, we examined the certiorari orders and parties' merits
briefs but not the certiorari petitions: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539 (1985); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
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or does not accord, the coordinate branches as a matter of constitutional
principle.244 This Part identifies three structural distinctions between
textual and nontextual review, and it examines how they might influence
courts to adopt a more regulatory mode of decisionmaking in
constitutional cases in which there is no legislative text being interpreted.
A. The Textual Canonicity of Statutes
One structural distinction between textual and nontextual review is
that, in statutory cases, there is a canonical, textual formulation of the
rules that are the object of judicial review. There is, as Jeremy Waldron
has observed, something unique about legislation as a form of law: it
creates an obligation to honor "the very words that the legislature
produces, to a much greater extent than we do in regard to
any other sources of law (or other sources of authority).245 To explain
by way of contrast, judge-made law is, as Waldron describes it,
"jurisgenerative.'246 Judicial lawmaking is justified by the fact that
judges may announce legal rules only in the service of resolving a
particular case.247 Therefore, when a court announces a legal rule that is
tailored to settling a specific dispute, it is necessary for subsequent courts
to reformulate that rule so that it is appropriate for resolving the dispute
in front of them.248 There is therefore no single, authoritative formulation
of judge-made legal rules that must be applied case after case.249
Legislation, however, operates differently. Legislative authority is
not constrained by precedent and is justified by the fact that statutes
244. Cf. Karlan, supra note 75, at 2-5, 29, 64 (arguing that the Roberts Court's
jurisprudence is characterized by a lack of respect to Congress). But see Keith E.
Whittington, The Least Activist Supreme Court in History? The Roberts Court and the
Exercise of Judicial Review, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2219 (2014) (arguing that the
Roberts Court is less willing than prior Courts to strike down legislation).
245. WALDRON, supra note 23, at 77.
246. Id. at 78.
247. Cf Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112
YALE L.J. 1943, 2006 (2003) ("The exercise of judicial power is justified and
circumscribed by the need to resolve a particular case or controversy, which means that
courts enforce constitutional rights if and only if it is necessary in order to decide a case.
Legislative power is not circumscribed in this same way.").
248. See WALDRON, supra note 23, at 78.
249. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 134 (3d ed. 2012); see also Jeremy
Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, Ill MICH. L. REv. 1,
25 (2012) ("There is no particular reason to be textualist about he general rules figured
out or crafted by judges in the course of reaching their decisions: the reasons that justify
textualism in the case of legislation don't really apply here.").
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announce prospective and generally applicable rules.250 Accordingly,
rules enacted by statute have a "'single, definitive linguistic
formulation;' 251 that is, the rules take a specific form that courts are
obligated to respect. There is a deep connection, Waldron argues,
between this "textual canonicity" and the way in which members of a
legislature deliberate over, settle conflicts concerning, and ultimately
decide upon the laws they enact.252 There is also, I argue, good reason to
think that the textual canonicity of legislation will lead judges to engage
in a fundamentally different mode of constitutional lawmaking in textual
review cases than they do in cases that do not require them to interpret a
statute.
In textual review cases, the textual canonicity of legislation may
lead judges toward a shared understanding of the constitutional issues
they are confronting in a particular case. In other constitutional cases, by
contrast, judges may lack this shared understanding and consequently
feel less constrained about using the case before them to advance a
particular regulatory agenda. As Waldron observed, the fact that statutes
are texts enable members of a diverse legislative
body-members who may lack a shared understanding of the aims they
hope to accomplish-to orient their debates around a shared focal
253point. Likewise, in deciding whether or not a statute (or an application
of that statute) is constitutional, each judge on a multi-member court
orients himself around a single, textual formulation of the rule. The fact
that judges are reviewing the constitutionality of a text may therefore
influence how they reason about the issue before them. When judges on
a multi-member court decide on the constitutionality of a statute or
action, one factor that may influence the decisionmaking is whether each
judge agrees on precisely what it is that they are reviewing. If judge x
and judge y think they are reviewing the constitutionality of different
issues, their decision-making aims are likely to diverge.
250. Jeremy Bentham, for example, touts this feature of legislation when
defending stable, rule-based "statute law" and critiquing the unstable nature of
judge-made common law. See JEREMY BENTHAM, Truth Versus Ashhurst; or, Law as it is,
Contrasted With What it is Said to Be, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 235
(Edinburgh, Simpkin, Marshall & Co. 1843) ("Just as a man makes laws for his dog.
When your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait till he does it, and then
beat him for it .... [T]his is the way the judges make law for you and me. They won't tell
a man beforehand what it is he should not do ... they lie by till he has done something
which they say he should not have done, and then they hang him for it.").
251. WALDRON, supra note 23, at 79 (quoting Robert S. Summers, Statutes and
Contracts as Founts of Formal Reasoning, in ESSAYS FOR PATRICK ATIYAH 71, 74 (Peter
Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1991)).
252. Id. at 80.
253. Id. at 81-82.
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However, to the extent that judges x and y agree upon the meanings
of specific words, a statutory text will help ensure that they are not
arguing at cross-purposes. These judges will benefit from what Waldron
has called a "determinate focus for discussion-something whose
existence is distinct from the will or tacit understandings of particular
members.,254 Moreover, the text that orients the judges' reasoning
announces a rule, and in so doing creates some constraints with regard to
the judges' evaluation of policy considerations that motivate the rule.
One feature of an entrenched legal rule is that it prevents decisionmakers
from considering certain factors that they would otherwise take into
account when making a decision.255 To paraphrase Fredrick Schauer, a
rule stating "no dogs are allowed in restaurants" may have been for the
purpose of preventing annoying disruptions in restaurants.256 That rule,
however, does not empower a judge to conclude that certain annoying
and disruptive people should not be allowed in restaurants. Nor does it
empower the judge to conclude that, notwithstanding the rule, pleasant
and undisruptive dogs should be made to feel welcome in restaurants. In
other words, the rule may have been enacted for the purpose of
preventing annoyances, but its enactment prevents judges from engaging
in a multifaceted examination of "annoyingness" when deciding whether
a restaurant was justified in denying service to a person or animal.257 As
Schuaer has argued, this process of screening off certain policy
considerations "takes place largely through the force of the language in
which rules are written. 2 58 Thus, the textual canonicity of legislative
rules is "the primary tool" by which they serve to constrain judges. 9
By contrast, in cases that do not involve textual review, courts
review the constitutionality of actions that are likely to be
polysemic-possessing multiple meanings-and different judges will
interpret those actions differently. The concept that actions in the world
can be polysemic is a familiar one to anthropologists and social theorists
who account for the ways in which participants in a shared culture agree
upon, and contest, the meaning of particular resources and symbols.260
254. Id. at 82.
255. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988).
256. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE 25-29 (1991).
257. See id. at 82 (describing a rule is an "instantiation" of a background
justification that is followed "even when that instantiation does not serve its generating
justification").
258. See Schauer, supra note 255, at 510.
259. Id.
260. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description, reprinted in THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS BY CLIFFORD GEERTZ 3, 6-7 (1973);
WILLIAM H. SEWELL JR., THE LOGICS OF HISTORY: SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL
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Recent empirical work in legal scholarship suggests that the polysemy of
actions can also explain aspects of constitutional decisionmaking. As
Dan Kahan and his research collaborators have shown, a significant risk
in constitutional lawmaking is the problem of "'motivated cognition,' the
ubiquitous tendency of people to form perceptions, and to process factual
information generally, in a manner congenial to their values and
desires.,261 In one study, for example, Kahan presented research subjects
with a video of a political demonstration and asked them questions
relevant to whether the demonstrators were engaging in constitutionally
protected speech or unprotected conduct.262 Half the research subjects
were instructed that they were watching a protest outside an abortion
clinic while the other half were advised that they were watching the
protest of the military's one-time don't-ask-don't-tell policy outside a
263 bomilitary recruitment center. Within both of these subgroups, subjects
with different cultural worldviews disagreed about key facts concerning
the video, including whether the subjects were obstructing, intimidating,
or threatening pedestrians.64 Such findings suggest that because
nonstatutory cases require courts to interpret the meaning of ambiguous
actions, judges may be freer to interpret the issue before them in a way
that suits their policy agenda.
This is not to suggest that legislative texts are inevitably
unambiguous, or that such texts strip judges of the discretion to interpret
statutes and regulations in ways that favor their ideological position.
There are, of course, notable cases in which members of the same court
drew radically divergent meanings out of the same statutory text.265 In
TRANSFORMATION 140-43 (2005); VICTOR W. TURNER, THE RITUAL PROCESS: STRUCTURE
AND ANTI-STRUCTURE 41-42 (1969).
261. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., "They Saw A Protest": Cognitive
Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REv. 851, 853 (2012).
262. Id. at 862-63.
263. Id. at 864.
264. See id at 883-85.
265. One powerful example is Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), in
which a five-justice majority upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18
U.S.C. § 1531. Id. at 132-33. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy characterized the
statute serving to keep women from terminating pregnancies in ways that they would
later come to regret. See id. at 159 ("While we find no reliable data to measure the
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their
choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained .... The State has an
interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed."). Writing for four dissenters,
Justice Ginsberg attacked this justification as both lacking empirical support and
reflecting "ancient notions about women's place in the family and under the
Constitution" that "have long since been discredited." Id. at 185 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). For Ginsburg, the statute "cannot be understood as anything other than an
effort to chip away at a right declared again and again by this Court-and with increasing
comprehension of its centrality to women's lives." Id at 191 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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many of these cases, it can hardly be said that the judges had a shared
understanding of the issue before them. In National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius,266 for example, the Justices disagreed
not only on whether the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate
violated the Commerce Clause but also on what type of activity the Act
was regulating.2 67 In the view of Justices Roberts and Kennedy, by
compelling individuals to purchase insurance, the individual mandate
created new economic activity that Congress lacked the power to
regulate.68 Justice Ginsburg, by contrast, characterized the individual
mandate as regulating an existing market-the medical care which
virtually all individuals will consume-that Congress was within its
authority to regulate.269
My suggestion, however, is that judges often will feel more
constrained when interpreting the meaning of a fixed text than when
interpreting the meaning of actions. Judges on a multi-member court may
have opposed ideological commitments, while at the same time
belonging to a shared linguistic community that agrees upon specific
practices for understanding the meaning of words and phrases that are
used in a legislative context.270 Therefore, by orienting judges around a
common text, and preventing them from reformulating the text to suit
their purposes, statutes may temper the sort of motivated cognition to
which judges are susceptible in constitutional cases.
B. Formalizing Rules of Governance
Another relevant distinction between textual and nontextual review
concerns the structural difference between a court being presented with a
regulatory regime (in the form of a legislative text) and constructing one
from scratch. Put simply, one of law's central functions is to regulate the
conduct of government officials by establishing rules that they have an
obligation to follow. 271 And the answer to a simple question-who bears
primary responsibility for regulating officials' conduct-has significant
266. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
267. See generally id. I am grateful to Eric Berger for this example.
268. See id. at 2647-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
269. See id. at 2619-20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
270. Cf John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
1287, 1316 n.129 (2010) ("Modem textualists start from the premise that while
interpretation is not mechanical, legislators can communicate effectively with judges,
administrators, and the public because of their common membership in a linguistic
community with shared practices for understanding a vast array of words and phrases in
context.").
271. See supra Part H.A.
Constitutional Decisionmaking
implications with respect to how courts discharge their institutional
responsibilities in constitutional cases.
In textual review cases, a legislature or agency is the primary
regulator by virtue of enacting a statute or rule that guides the action of
government officials. 72 If the constitutionality of a statute or regulation
is challenged, a court will be presented with a formalized system of
regulation that it had no direct role in developing.273 The court's role in
these cases is to determine whether the challenged statute or regulation is
unconstitutional. If it upholds the law, then the regulatory system
remains in effect. If it rejects the law, it invalidates (in whole or in part)
the regulatory system that the law sets out. When this happens, the court
may suggest that the legislature or agency enact a new rule that achieves
the institution's regulatory goals in a constitutional manner, or it may say
nothing whatsoever.74 Ultimately, however, the court is not the principal
institution occupying the relevant regulatory space.
By contrast, in cases that do not involve textual review, courts
evaluate the constitutionality of actions that may not have been guided
by a formalized regulatory system. From a court's perspective, the action
it is reviewing involves a policy space that no legislature or agency has
decided to systematically regulate. The court might therefore perceive
itself to be passing on the constitutionality of an action that occurred in a
regulatory vacuum. Of course, this perception may be incorrect. In many
nontextual review cases, the executive's actions still will be governed by
a complex system of statutes, regulations, and unwritten norms.275
However, if deciding a constitutional claim does not require the court to
interpret these statutes, regulations, or norms, then the court may regard
itself as having to devise a formal regulatory system from scratch. From
the court's perceptive, a nontextual review case may create the obligation
(or, at least, the opportunity) to construct a system of regulation that will
allow officials to execute their duties in a manner that conforms to the
Constitution. A court's lawmaking function in such cases is therefore
unlike its function in cases wherein the court simply evaluates the
constitutionality of a regulatory system that another institution has
created.
Thus, the presence or absence of a statute may fundamentally alter
the way in which courts construct formal rules of governance. As
272. See O'Rourke, supra note 5, at 445.
273. In as-applied cases, the court may also be required to evaluate the
constitutionality of a specific action that an official took under the authority of a statute.
Significantly, however, the action is an instantiation of a formalized regulatory system
laid out in a statute or regulation. See supra Part I.A.3.
274. See, e.g., supra note 110 and accompanying text.
275. See supra Part I.A.2.
2015:87
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
sociologist Arthur Stinchcombe has defined them, formal systems
(including formal legal systems) consist of sets of variables (such as
legal rules) that are "unified by their theoretical function.' 276 One of the
theoretical functions of a legal system, for example, is to guide the
behavior of government officials.2 77 As Stinchcombe defines the concept,
a legal system is "formal" to the extent that the legal rules are written in
authoritative texts (which could take the form of judicial opinions as well
as statutes) that are sufficiently unambiguous to guide individuals and
officials in their conduct.278 Conversely, a legal system is not formal if its
rules are too ambiguous or not sufficiently stable to provide officials
with meaningful guidance. In such an informal legal system, the conduct
of government officials would be guided by the mercurial customs and
norms of everyday social life rather than by a predictable and stable set
of abstracted rules.279 Thus, as Frederick Schauer has observed, formal
rules can serve to allocate power between different decisionmakers.180 If
a decisionmaker chooses to establish a formal system of rules, she
thereby eliminates the discretion of the officials over whom the
decisionmaker has authority. By contrast, an agent who is unconstrained
by rules has the power to consider a wide range of factors, and to make
broad value judgments, when deciding on the best course of action.281
This understanding of formality highlights an important structural
difference in the way courts make decisions in textual review cases as
compared to constitutional cases that do not involve textual review. In
cases involving textual review, courts are typically spared the task of
276. See STINCHCOMBE, supra note 26, at 53.
277. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY
222 (2d ed. 2009) ("A legal system which does in general observe the rule of law treats
people as persons at least in the sense that it attempts to guide their behavior through
affecting the circumstances of their action."); Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and
Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625, 630
(1984) (differentiating between "conduct rules" that are "directed at the general public
and provide[] guidelines for conduct" and "decision rules" that are "directed at the
officials and provide[] guidelines for their decisions"); see also Jeremy Waldron,
Vagueness and the Guidance of Action, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN
THE LAW 58, 61 (Andrei Marmour & Scott Soames eds., 2011) (stating that "almost
everyone writing in jurisprudence today" accepts Raz's argument that "guiding action (or
guiding conduct or guiding behavior) is the mode of governance distinctive to law").
278. See STINCHCOMBE, supra note 26, at 55 (explaining that "[a] community
language" is "said to be formalized to the degree to which there exist institutions and
understandings that reduce the residual semantic variance ... , given the text"); see also
id. at 8-9 (defining formality).
279. Id. at 17.
280. SCHAUER, supra note 256, at 159. Additionally, rules can be used to allocate
power temporally within the same set of decisionmakers, binding individuals in the future
to their present assessment of the best course of action. See id. at 160.
281. Id. at 159.
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designing formal rules from scratch that are meant to govern the
behavior of government officials. Instead, a court must choose whether
to uphold a formal regulatory system that the legislature has chosen to
establish (in the form of a statute) or to invalidate the system.82 When
evaluating the constitutionality of a statutory text, the court does not have
to turn its attention to the messy facts of "raw social life" that the statute
was designed to reflect and to govern.283 Instead, the court chooses
whether the abstracted rule is constitutional (if the case involves a facial
challenge) or whether an application of that rule is constitutional (if the
case involves an as-applied challenge). One could helpfully caricature
the choice in such cases as a binary between accepting and rejecting a
legal rule. In reality, the choice is more complicated; for example, the
court could apply the constitutional avoidance canon to interpret the
statute in an unconventional way284 or decide that a portion of a statute is
unconstitutional but that it can be severed from the constitutionally
permissible remainder of the statute.285  Notwithstanding these
complexities, however, the court does not have to look behind the legal
rule to evaluate whether it reflects the reality of the situations that it is
meant to govern. Or, as Justice Roberts wrote in upholding the
Affordable Care Act as a valid exercise of Congress's taxing power:
"Because the Constitution permits such a tax, it is not our role to forbid
it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness."
2 86
Thus, in textual review cases, the court is not choosing among
formalities, but it is making a decision whether to accept or reject a
formal legal rule. If the court upholds the rule as constitutional, then it
accepts the formality that the legislature (or agency) developed. If it
invalidates the rule entirely, then it rejects the formality and leaves that
area to be governed by informal norms until the legislature decides to
adopt a new rule to regulate the area. If the court instead deems a portion
282. STINCHCOMBE, supra note 26, at 6. Stinchcombe's example of informally
embedded formality is an intermediate appellate court choosing between two controlling
cases to decide a difficult issue. 1d. If an appellate court wishes to distinguish or overturn
an earlier case, it "does not go all the way back to the analysis of raw social life" to
justify its decision. Id. at 5. Instead, it seeks out reasons provided in another controlling
case (or in other parts of the same controlling case) to reach its decision. Id. at 5-6.
283. This process is similar to what Stinchcombe calls "informally embedded
formality," which occurs when an actor "chooses among embedded formalities by a
somewhat informal process." Id. at 6.
284. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557
U.S. 193, 206-11 (2009) (interpreting Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act to exclude a
local utility district); Hasen, supra note 64, at 205-06 (criticizing the Court's statutory
interpretation in NAMUDNO).
285. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2607-08 (2012) (severing a portion of the Affordable Care Act).
286. Id. at 2600.
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of a statute unconstitutional but severs it from the rest of a statute, then it
modifies the formal rule while otherwise allowing it to govern officials'
behavior. At no point, however, does the court engage in the process of
constructing a formal rule from scratch.287
By contrast, in cases that do not involve textual review, the court's
decision-making process might be driven by its desire to construct
effective formal rules of governance that they perceive to be absent from
the legal system. In these cases, when a court does not perceive there to
be a rule governing the conduct of executive officials, it may try to
formalize a rule that will serve this function.288 Unlike in textual review,
this process allows courts to engage in a detailed manner with the social
realities that a rule is meant to govern. For a formal rule to be effective, it
must do a better job governing social conduct than if officials were free
to operate according to informal norms.289 Specifically, if a rule is to
effectively guide officials' behavior, it must be what Stinchcombe calls a
"cognitively adequate" abstraction of the social and physical world that
the officials inhabit.2 90 This requires the decisionmaker to ensure both
that the rule accurately takes account of all the relevant aspects of a
situation in which the rule is meant to be applied, and that the rule is
sufficiently "cognitively economical" for officials to understand and
apply.
291
287. This is not to say that the social realities underlying a piece of legislation
are always irrelevant to its constitutionality. For example, in deciding whether a statute
violates the Establishment Clause because it lacks a secular purpose, it is "the duty of the
courts to distinguis[h] a sham secular purpose from a sincere one." McCreary Cnty. v.
ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 864 (2005) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, a court cannot "turn a blind eye to the context in which [a] policy arose"
and accordingly must examine the social and political environment in which a challenged
statute was enacted. Id. at 866 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,
315 (2000)).
288. In contrast to the process of "informally embedded formality," see supra
note 283, this process resembles what Stinchcombe calls "formality being constructed," a
process that can entail either constructing a "more formal, or better, formal system," or
"simply patch[ing] up the mistakes that formality would lead to." STINCHCOMBE, supra
note 26, at 7.
289. STINCHCOMBE, supra note 26, at 53. It is not necessary, for purposes of this
exposition, to define what is meant by "more desirable." Instead, we can bracket the
normative question of what purpose a formal system should serve and define formality as
working properly to the extent that it adequately serves whatever purpose one assigns to
it.
290. Id. at 20.
291. Id. at 21. More precisely, according to Stinchcombe, a formal system
achieves cognitive adequacy to the degree:
(1) that it accurately portrays the world in a manner that (2) is cognitively
economical (it does not have much noise and is not difficult to grasp) to work
with to yield the correct diagnosis and the correct remedy, (3) that the
description is full enough to include all the aspects of the situation relevant o
Constitutional Decisionmaking
Consider, for example, a rule that instructs a police officer how to
search the car of a person arrested following a traffic stop. If the rule is
too complicated to apply, and is thus not cognitively economical, police
officers are likely to disregard it. At the same time, however, the rule
must reflect all the aspects of social life that are relevant to ensuring that
the officer is being properly governed. These aspects will include the fact
that the officer has two powerful incentives to conduct as extensive a
search as possible. First, the officer may have a constitutionally
illegitimate incentive to obtain all possible evidence against the suspect
without going through the trouble of obtaining a search warrant. Second,
the officer will have a (legitimate) concern for her safety and will want to
ensure that the suspect is unable to endanger her life. If the rule is to
successfully balance the officer's safety and the suspect's privacy rights,
it must accurately reflect he realities of a spur-of-the-moment arrest. If
the officer does not feel that she can apply the rule without endangering
her safety, she will ignore the rule and operate according to instinct,
custom, or some other norm of everyday social life. However, if the
officer can apply the rule in a way that invades the suspect's privacy
rights even when her safety is not threatened, then the rule will fail to
serve its underlying purpose. In either case, the rule will lack cognitive
adequacy and will thus fail to meaningfully govern the officer's
conduct.2 92 Either the rule will fall into disuse, or it will be applied as a
sort of ritual that does not serve the purpose for which it was designed.93
Thus, the process of deciding constitutional cases that do not
involve textual review requires courts to attend to the social realities of
the policy areas they are seeking to govern.294 If the court constructs a
rule that fails to account for these realities, then officials will likely
disregard the rule and fall back on informal norms when confronted with
an unforeseen situation. Accordingly, as Frederick Schauer has written,
the rule must be sufficiently "entrenched" that the official will not "look
past" the rule to determine whether its underlying purpose would be
served by following it in a particular situation.295 This requires that a rule
the action to be taken, and finally, (4) that the scope to which the abstraction
system applies is wide enough that most situations that have to be acted on
are included.
Id. at 21-22.
292. Id. at 22.
293. Cf id. (characterizing abstractions with low-cognitive adequacy as
"ritualistic").
294. Cf id at 25 (stating that a cognitively adequate formal variable must
account for "everything essential to the governing purposes for a given
situation ... extracted from the relevant reality").
295. SCHAUER, supra note 256, at 42-51; see also STINCHCOMBE, supra note 26,
at 26-27 ("In general, if the abstraction in a formality is sufficient, there is no reason for
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be grounded in a realistic assessment of the contingencies and risks that
an official will confront in situations where the rule is supposed to apply.
For example, if officers require some flexibility in applying a
stop-and-search rule in order to protect their safety or achieve their law
enforcement goals, a court could lower the standard of proof required to
conduct a stop.296 This would enable officers to act on incomplete
information about whether a particular individual poses a danger and
thus would give them more discretion than they would be afforded by a
rule that would require probable cause before conducting a search.297 In
order to construct such a rule, however, courts must have a great deal of
information about the realities that define law enforcement encounters
with criminal suspects.
Thus, the process of deciding constitutional cases in the absence of
a statute will require courts to construct relatively complex and
innovative constitutional doctrine. In order to construct a cognitively
adequate rule, courts must adopt doctrinal strategies to supervise and
monitor the rules' application in order to assess whether they are
cognitively adequate.98 The constitutional adjudication process is well
suited to this task because courts are often confronted with instances in
which the actions of an official violated the Constitution. A court can
therefore get a sense of whether a particular rule would correct the
constitutional problem that occurred in a specific case. The court will
then adapt and modify the rule as it is presented with new cases, which
gives it a more robust understanding of the social realities that it is
seeking to regulate. Therefore, in cases not involving textual review, the
process of constructing a constitutional doctrine will involve a relatively
high degree of experimentation as courts try to identify flaws with a
formal rule and decide how to adapt that rule so that it is cognitively
adequate to govern future actions.299
the governing process based on the formality to review the reality behind the
abstraction.").
296. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that a police officer
may search an individual for weapons if"he has reason to believe that he is dealing with
an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest
the individual for a crime").
297. See STINCHCOMBE, supra note 26, at 26 (citing arrest rules to illustrate that
"many formal systems require people to act on insufficient information, and they
sometimes take that explicitly into account").
298. See id at 35 (observing that the process of formality being constructed
"often includes periods of intense 'supervision' of the formalities being introduced,
because the designers of the formality cannot tell what needs fixing without seeing what
goes wrong"); supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrinal
strategies that courts may adopt to supervise and monitor officials).
299. See id at 7 (stating that the process of formality being constructed "can take
the form of discussion, experimentation, distinguishing cases, writing memos (or briefs to
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Accordingly, in these nontextual review cases, courts tend to be
more oriented toward the reality of the situations they are trying to
govern. In Miranda v. Arizona,30 0 for example, the Supreme Court
developed a detailed set of operational rules that were meant to "dispel
the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings."3 1 The Court
therefore had to ground its decisionmaking on its perception of the
physical and psychological realities of encounters between police and
suspects. Likewise, in Maryland v. Shatzer,302 the Court assumed that
once a suspect has been released from custody, 14 days "provides plenty
of time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult
with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects
of his prior custody."30 3 And, in a recent case narrowing the scope of
Miranda, the Court surmised that "interview tactics" designed to
encourage a nonarrested suspect's confession (such as informing a
suspect that her "silence could be used in a future prosecution") are not
so inherently coercive that they "deprive a witness of the ability to
voluntarily invoke the privilege" against self-incrimination.3 4 In terms of
restricting and expanding the right against self-incrimination, the
outcomes of these cases differ dramatically (as, of course, do the
ideological propensities of the Warren and Roberts Courts).30 5 In each
case, however, the Court justified its holding (and constructed or
modified the rules that govern police confessions) based on the Justices'
understandings of what interrogations are actually like.30 6
Of course, this regulatory lawmaking process poses significant
challenges.0 7  Appellate courts are notoriously limited in their
information-gathering capacities, and the Supreme Court is frequently
criticized for making policy decisions based on information outside the
a higher court)-attempts to locate the problems in the abstraction and discern what
change or adaptation could grasp the substance sufficiently well for further action").
300. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
301. Id. at 458.
302. 559 U.S. 98 (2010).
303. Id. at I 10 (holding that confessions obtained after a 14-day break in custody
are valid and do not violate an individual's Miranda rights).
304. Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2183-84 (2013).
305. See Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 109; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79.
306. See Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 113-14; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-49.
307. See generally Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and
Institutional Design, 124 HARv. L. REv. 1422 (2011) (analyzing problems courts and
other institutions face in acquiring information and institutional strategies for addressing
those problems). For a classic examination of the judiciary's institutional competence,




record that the Justices are unqualified to interpret.3 °8 Scholars and jurists
frequently invoke these institutional handicaps to justify or criticize
particular interpretive methodologies30 9 or to criticize the validity of
particular constitutional decisions.3  A functionalist analysis of textual
and nontextual review, however, suggests that much of this criticism may
be beside the point. If courts must construct formalized rules in cases that
do not involve textual review, then this type of constitutional lawmaking
requires courts to make empirical assumptions about the world they are
regulating. Regardless of whether courts are well designed to assess the
reality underlying a constitutional rule, doing so is an inescapable part of
lawmaking when no statute is at issue.
C. Institutional Design and Legislative Constitutionalism
A third, somewhat more obvious structural difference between
textual and nontextual review is also linked to the question of which
institution a court believes to be better suited to certain forms of
constitutional decisionmaking. Advocates of "legislative
constitutionalism" have documented the degree to which legislatures
participate in the constitutional lawmaking process by enacting statutes
that concretize and implement the general commitments et forth in the
Constitution.311 However, in addition to these significant and relatively
rare statutory enactments, legislatures can also play a constitutional
lawmaking role simply by crafting legislation that pursues their policy
aims in constitutionally permissible ways. This role is particularly
valuable with respect to addressing constitutional questions that arise
from complex legislative and regulatory frameworks, which courts may
be ill equipped to address.312 Thus, if a court identifies constitutional
problems with a statute or regulation, it may wish to rely on the
308. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REv. 1, 35-42
(2011) (arguing that "empirical factfinding" in ideologically divisive cases can provoke
the Justices to engage in "motivated reasoning" and erode public confidence in the
Court's impartiality); Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v.
Casey Martin, 2001 SuP. CT. REv. 267, 285-86 (discussing constitutional cases in which
the Court made empirical judgments on matters outside the Justices' expertise based on
information outside the record).
309. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 154-57 (2006).
310. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 308, at 295-97.
311. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
312. Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 1279-80 (endorsing James Bradley
Thayer's argument that "many constitutional questions encompass not merely technical
legal issues, but instead large questions of constitutional policy and politics that
legislators are better suited to decide than judges").
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legislature to craft new laws that adequately address those problems.
Although modem legislatures operate under serious constraints of time
and information,313 they are nonetheless structured to allow serious
deliberation over significant matters that occupy their policy agendas.314
For example, as Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule have observed,
these deliberative structures harness the "collective character" of
Congress and thereby serve "to encourage the revelation of private
information, to expose extreme, polarized viewpoints to the moderating
effect of diverse arguments, to legitimate outcomes by providing reasons
to defeated parties, and to require the articulation of public-spirited
justifications for legislators' votes.,315 Hence, Congress may be better
situated than courts to resolve constitutional issues in a manner that
"blend[s] policy considerations with technical legal arguments.316
Similarly, deliberative structures of administrative law may give
agencies a unique vantage point with respect to complex constitutional
problems.317 Moreover, the policy expertise of administrative agencies
may enable them to resolve constitutional problems with a greater
318creativity than courts possess.
Significantly, these considerations may incentivize courts to engage
in a less regulatory mode of constitutional adjudication even when, as a
factual matter, a legislature or agency does not possess the institutional
strengths that courts assume. To the extent that courts are cognizant of
their own institutional inadequacies with respect to analyzing complex
regulatory problems, there is reason to think they may develop a
sanguine (if inaccurate) view of other institutions' expertise in these
matters.319 For example, Eric Berger has argued that the Supreme Court
313. See generally BRYAN D. JONES & FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, THE POLITICS
OF ATTENTION: How GOVERNMENT PRIORITIZES PROBLEMS (2005); JOHN W. KINGDON,
AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d ed. 2011).
314. See Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the
Legislative Process, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1915, 1935 (2011) (observing that procedural
"[r]equirements such as bicameralism, discussion in committee, and three readings, as
well as the rules that regulate discussion and require minimal periods of time between the
several steps of the legislative process, are all designed to enable and promote debate and
deliberation").
315. Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 1291.
316. Id. at 1318.
317. See Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional
Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 522-30 (2010) (arguing that
"[a]gencies ... hold potential as sites for public deliberation on and engagement with
constitutional meaning").
318. Cf id. at 528 (arguing that "agencies are able to adopt and implement
far-reaching reforms that can be more effective than court-ordered relief in avoiding and
remedying constitutional problems in administrative settings").
319. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY
AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 23-25 (2001) (describing the "single institutionalism" fallacy of
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frequently defers to prison officials with respect to constitutionally
sensitive issues based on the unfounded (and mistaken) assumption that
those officials have the expertise necessary to address such issues.32°
Thus, in Baze v. Rees,321 the Court upheld Kentucky's lethal injection
procedures on the ground that judicial intervention would "embroil the
courts in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise, and
would substantially intrude on the role of state legislatures in
implementing their execution procedures.322 In reality, however,
Kentucky's legislature had delegated the administration of lethal
injection procedures to prison officials who had little expertise or
qualification to implement the constitutionally sensitive policy.
323
Nevertheless, cases like Baze exemplify the Court's cautious
approach to constitutional lawmaking in textual review cases.324 This is
because, with respect to the distinction between textual and nontextual
review, the question is not whether legislatures and agencies actually
possess institutional advantages over courts with respect to some forms
of constitutional lawmaking. Rather, the question is whether courts think
that legislatures and agencies possess such advantages.
IV. THE LIMITS OF STATUTORY CONSTRAINT
While this Article has argued for the existence of a previously
unrecognized constraint on constitutional decisionmaking-the presence
of statutes-there are important limits to the scope of its argument.
Specifically, this Article claims only that the presence of a statute is a
potential influence on constitutional decisionmaking. However, it is far
from the only influence on judicial decisionmaking and in many cases
will not be the dominant influence. Consider, for example, the many
pressures that work alongside statutory constraint to shape Supreme
Court decisionmaking. In many contexts, there will be other political or
failing to evaluate institutions' relative competence to address a policy issue); O'Rourke,
supra note 5, at 443-48 (arguing that the fallacy of single institutionalism leads courts to
devolve too much regulatory authority to law enforcement officials in criminal procedure
cases).
320. See Berger, Individual Rights, supra note 72, at 2046.
321. 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
322. Id. at 51.
323. See Berger, Individual Rights, supra note 72, at 2039-40.
324. It bears noting, however, that Baze is an example of regulatory rather than
statutory constraint. The Kentucky Legislature provided a statutory basis for the State's
lethal injection protocol by enacting a statute mandating lethal injection as the method of
execution for death-sentenced prisoners. See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431.220(l)(a)
(LexisNexis 2010); Baze, 553 U.S. at 44. The Kentucky Department of Corrections then
developed a written protocol to comply with the statute. See Baze, 553 U.S. at
44-45.
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structural pressures that are certain to overshadow any effect that
statutory constraints might otherwise have on constitutional
decisionmaking. To offer just one example of a political concern that
appears to override the effect of statutory constraints, consider the
Supreme Court's landmark abortion cases.325 Both Roe v. Wade326 and
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey3 7 involved
constitutional challenges to statutes restricting abortion.328 However,
these cases established a detailed framework governing the ways in
which state legislatures may regulate women's access to abortion.
Specifically, in Roe, the Court adopted a "trimester" framework that gave
states greater freedom to restrict abortions as a pregnancy progresses.329
In Casey, the Court rejected this framework in favor of an "undue
burden" standard that is relatively malleable in theory330 but which the
Court applied to develop a detailed set of rules governing issues of
spousal consent, parental notification, and exceptions for the life and
health of the mother.33' Roe and Casey thus illustrate that, in textual
review cases involving ideologically fraught issues, the Court is willing
to engage in regulatory decisionmaking to limit the discretion of state
legislatures that might otherwise seek to ignore or manipulate a more
deferential judicial rule.
Even in less politically fraught contexts, there may be structural
pressures that override the effects of statutory constraint in textual review
cases. Consider, for example, Zadvydas v. Davis,332 in which the Court
construed the federal alien removal statute333 to contain "an implicit
325. For an account of the politics that inform abortion jurisprudence, see Linda
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About
Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028 (2011) (discussing the politics of abortion preceding Roe
v. Wade); Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1706-35 (2008) (discussing abortion politics
in the wake of Casey).
326. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
327. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
328. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844 (addressing a Pennsylvania statute that required
married women to obtain spousal consent for abortions except in life-threatening
emergencies, and required minor women to obtain parental consent under similar
circumstances); Roe, 410 U.S. at 117-18 (addressing a Texas statute making it a crime to
"attempt" or "procure" any abortion that was not "procured or attempted by medical
advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
329. SeeRoe, 410 U.S. at 162-64.
330. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 ("Only where state regulation imposes an undue
burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into
the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.").
331. See id. at 872-88, 900-01.
332. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 1 am grateful to Aziz Huq for this example.
333. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006).
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'reasonable time' limitation, the application of which is subject to
federal-court review."334 By its terms, the statute permits the government
to detain an alien who is found to be unlawfully present in the United
States for longer than 90 days if the alien is "determined by the Attorney
General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the
order of removal.335 In order to avoid constitutional concerns, the Court
interpreted the removal statute to permit an alien to challenge his or her
detention after being held for an "unreasonable" period of time. More
specifically, however, the Court held that a detention exceeding six
months was presumptively unreasonable, and entitles an alien to release
if she can produce evidence that "provides good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future" and the government is unable to rebut this showing.336 The
Court's rationale for establishing this six-month window was its interest
in "uniform administration" of the reasonableness requirement "in the
federal courts.337 Thus, in some textual review cases, the Court may
engage in regulatory decisionmaking for administrative reasons that
trump the effect of statutory constraint.
The power of these additional structural and political influences
does not detract from the fact that statutes can also influence
constitutional decisionmaking. The core aims of this Article are to
provide qualitative evidence that the presence of legislative texts
correlates with a regulatory mode of constitutional adjudication and to
offer theoretical reasons for this correlation. This is not to suggest,
however, that the strength of this correlation will match that of more
obvious and well-documented factors that shape constitutional
decisionmaking.338 Ultimately, this Article provides a preliminary
examination of a phenomenon that has largely gone unexplored in
constitutional scholarship. The relative importance of this phenomenon is
certain to vary from context to context and merits further exploration.
334. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682.
335. § 1231(a)(6).
336. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
337. Id.
338. Cf Richard Lempert, The Significance of Statistical Significance: Two
Authors Restate an Incontrovertible Caution. Why A Book?, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
225, 234-35 (2009) (reviewing STEPHEN T. ZILIAK & DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT
OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE: HOW THE STANDARD ERROR COSTS US JOBS, JUSTICE, AND
LIVES (2008)) (discussing the distinction between statistical significance and strength of
correlation and the relevance of the distinction to legal scholarship).
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CONCLUSION
Ultimately this Article is an appeal for a new scholarly
conversation. For many years, legislation scholars have recognized the
ways in which constitutional norms shape the day-to-day statutory
interpretation practices of modem courts.33 9 This Article hopes to redirect
some of that energy to exploring the obverse question: to what extent do
statutes shape constitutional norms? Such exploration, I argue, could
generate significant insights into questions of institutional design and
constitutional legitimacy. Although my exploration of this question is
merely preliminary, I intend for it to motivate constitutional theorists to
continue exploring the extent to which legislative texts shape
constitutional adjudication.
For example, the distinction between textual and nontextual review
could offer a powerful reason for designing legislative and agency
structures to facilitate greater constitutional deliberation.340 As Garrett
and Vermeule have observed, decisions about the scope of constitutional
rights often require a policymaker to decide how to allocate resources
and structure policies that will ensure that individuals can avail
themselves of those rights.34' Moreover, the announcement of a new
constitutional right will often place those right holders in conflict with
others who wish to exercise a conflicting, and equally valid,
constitutional right.342 In other words, sound constitutional lawmaking
often requires that some institution impose detailed, substantive
regulatory obligations on competing actors. As this Article has shown,
courts are likely to occupy this regulatory role in cases where they do not
identify a legislative text that serves this function. By examining the
structural reasons that explain these patterns of judicial behavior, this
Article lays the groundwork for a deeper exploration into the desirability
339. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545,
564-65 (1990) (arguing that "phantom constitutional norms" rooted in "mainstream
public law" deeply inform contemporary immigration law); Bertrall L. Ross II, Against
Constitutional Mainstreaming, 78 U. CHi. L. REV. 1203, 1205-07 (2011) (describing and
critiquing the extent to which constitutional norms have informed the Supreme Court's
recent statutory interpretation jurisprudence); Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of
Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 3 n.3 (2004) (citing
theories of statutory interpretation that are informed by constitutional principles).
340. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 27 (exploring how to improve
Congress's capacity for constitutional deliberation); Metzger, supra note 317 (describing
and defending the ways in which agencies incorporate constitutional deliberation into
their lawmaking).
341. Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 1315.
342. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, 99 ETHics 503 (1989).
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and normative legitimacy of constitutional adjudication in the absence of
statutes.
